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> But not everybody is entitled to privacy in all situations. Most people are entitled to privacy on the machines that they own. Having to log or monitor inte
by Skunkleton 11y ago
> But not everybody is entitled to privacy in all situations.
Most people are entitled to privacy on the machines that they own. Having to log or monitor internet traffic is the special case, and should not be the default.
> That privacy and safety stand in a big conflict was recently quite dramatically demonstrated when a pilot hid his psychological problems from his employer and intentionally caused a plane to crash.
You claim a background in psychology, you should be able to recognise this as fear mongering.
> The trust there is acquired by giving someone at a specific (private!) institution money and a copy of a passport. This system does not scale, and the number of SSL hosts is exploding.
A technological limitation in the current state of internet crypto is not a reason to abandon the concept. Everyone agrees that the concept of a CA isn't great. Someone will solve the problem eventually.
> SSL is bloody expensive compared to not doing it.
SSL is largely implemented in hardware these days. This is no longer true.
> SSL scales really badly intentionally.
I find it hard to accept that someone sat down and designed a system to not scale intentionally. Especially hard to believe when you look at the scale of SSL deployment today.
> A big cost of encryption however is lawful interception. This is not the place to discuss if governments should have the ability to intercept your internet traffic or not but in many cases they have that right.
A big cost of any societal construct is law enforcement. You can make the same argument about cars, or wigs, or plastic surgery. Most of the world strives to not limit personal freedoms out of fear.
> Unfortunately because it means that if a website hosts partially illegal shared content, then the whole website is down and not just the subsets of it which are legally problematic.
It is up to the website owners to manage this risk, with or without encryption.
> A shocking amount of Windows users run software that MITMs SSL connections to scan for viruses, malware etc. Even Ad providers (Superfish cough) started to destroy SSL traffic because it became so widespread that it was necessary. I'm firmly of the opinion that none of that would have happened if SSL traffic was less common.
MITM is the default with unsecured traffic. Again, TLS isn't perfect, but why give up?
> To give you an example of how ridiculous our love for SSL has become: PyPI. It's the Python package service. As of recently the Python package installer downloads every package via SSL. Why? There is no technical reason for this unless you want to hide from someone that you are downloading a specific Python package which seems pointless.
NO!!!!! Package managers are a huge target! What better way to sneak malicious code into someone work than through package management traffic? TLS mitigates this! This is a situation in which a trusted connection is a must.
- tekacs 11y agoYou need to edit this comment to add additional newlines after the quotes - your responses are otherwise merged with them.
- Skunkleton 11y agoThanks. Updated.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- thomashabets2 11y agoThe article does say that you should check the chec— oh, it says "verify the checksum with one you downloaded from a secure place". Oh… oh no. You're right. To the author: What, pray tell, is this magical secure place that's secure despite not being authenticated or encrypted?
- jessaustin 11y agoThe very next sentence of TFA is, "As there is no need to operate on a partial file there is no technical reason why the entire transfer would have to be SSL encrypted." Clearly, the procedure envisioned is that the checksum is served over TLS.
- Skunkleton 11y agoSo then what? Am I supposed to connect to multiple servers, one for SHAs and the other for blobs? What is the point of that? To be fair, by this point in the article I was just skimming it.
- jessaustin 11y agoChecksums can be simply listed on TLS-enabled websites, or in PGPed emails, or whatever. They don't need to be on CDNs, which in many cases would be indicated for software distribution. The other thing to keep in mind is that a checksum can certify the entire distribution process, from a packager's personal machine all the way to your hard drive. TLS only proves that no one eavesdropped on the connection between your client and whatever machine claims to be the CDN, which for software distribution is pointless and unhelpful.