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Google certainly are doing this differently, and I even mentioned how (less flexible, more efficient, different narrative). But then every company that engages

Google certainly are doing this differently, and I even mentioned how (less flexible, more efficient, different narrative). But then every company that engages in this does it differently. GE does it differently from Microsoft does it differently from IBM does it differently from IV. In fact, one of the models IV actually seems to have is closer to what Google is proposing here... They have a "sell your invention" page that has similar inputs as what Google describes. Again, I've never interacted with IV, but I expect it's be like any other licensing negotiations rather than "name your price, we'll buy it if we like it". So the big difference (other than being a practicing entity) is, to your point, Google has made the process simpler by eliminating the negotiation aspect. This certainly would be a good experience for sellers... If it works. The reason everybody else negotiates is because it's very hard to price patents (or anything, really). Unless you have a dialog about why each side think it's worth what, nobody will agree on a price. As such I would guess Google will end up acquiring only those patents that are actually useful and people underprice. These will be very few mostly because 1) very few patents actually cover anything useful and 2) people almost always vastly overvalue their inventions. I say this partly from personal experience and partly from hearsay, but the fact that the vast majority (95% +) of active patents lie fallow backs this up. People have paid thousands for a piece of paper that they're getting 0 returns on. Google may very well get some good patents submitted, but if they don't negotiate, they will either leave them on the table or pay more than they're worth. Certainly would be very interesting to see how this turns out.

dragonwriter 11y ago
> Google certainly are doing this differently, and I even mentioned how (less flexible, more efficient, different narrative). But then every company that engages in this does it differently. Even so Google is different in the high-level meta structure of how it is doing it differently, since it has a both an established and still operational more traditional, more flexible, more general, and less streamlined system and the new, experimental, less flexible, more specific, and more streamlined system. It's essentially do a public (not "visible only to insiders", though obviously the operational details of the results are unlikely to be public) real-business-at-stake side-by-side test of different options. > As such I would guess Google will end up acquiring only those patents that are actually useful and people underprice. I suspect that there are a wide range of potential patents that have expected value to Google that exceeds their expected value to most (and possibly any) other market participant that could actually muster the resources to pay that value, so I don't think "underpriced" is the only option. I also don't think "useful" in the sense that the patent actually covers a useful invention is necessary, anything that might provide a remotely colorable case for a Google-hostile entity to use against something useful Google does or might do in the life of the patent (even if it doesn't actually cover the thing Google is concerned about, and even if it wouldn't survive scrutiny in a lawsuit) can have positive net utility for Google to secure to prevent a hostile party from doing so if the price tag is less than the expected cost of defeating it in a lawsuit times the probability of such a suit should a hostile party get a hold of it. > Google may very well get some good patents submitted, but if they don't negotiate, they will either leave them on the table or pay more than they're worth. Paying above-market price but spending less resources on the pre-purchase process than would be spent getting down to market price can be a net win. An even bigger net win if it makes Google such an attractive place to shop your patents that the most threatening patents that would otherwise get picked up by Google-hostile entities end up getting shopped to Google first.

dragonwriter 11y ago

> Google certainly are doing this differently, and I even mentioned how (less flexible, more efficient, different narrative). But then every company that engages in this does it differently. Even so Google is different in the high-level meta structure of how it is doing it differently, since it has a both an established and still operational more traditional, more flexible, more general, and less streamlined system and the new, experimental, less flexible, more specific, and more streamlined system. It's essentially do a public (not "visible only to insiders", though obviously the operational details of the results are unlikely to be public) real-business-at-stake side-by-side test of different options. > As such I would guess Google will end up acquiring only those patents that are actually useful and people underprice. I suspect that there are a wide range of potential patents that have expected value to Google that exceeds their expected value to most (and possibly any) other market participant that could actually muster the resources to pay that value, so I don't think "underpriced" is the only option. I also don't think "useful" in the sense that the patent actually covers a useful invention is necessary, anything that might provide a remotely colorable case for a Google-hostile entity to use against something useful Google does or might do in the life of the patent (even if it doesn't actually cover the thing Google is concerned about, and even if it wouldn't survive scrutiny in a lawsuit) can have positive net utility for Google to secure to prevent a hostile party from doing so if the price tag is less than the expected cost of defeating it in a lawsuit times the probability of such a suit should a hostile party get a hold of it. > Google may very well get some good patents submitted, but if they don't negotiate, they will either leave them on the table or pay more than they're worth. Paying above-market price but spending less resources on the pre-purchase process than would be spent getting down to market price can be a net win. An even bigger net win if it makes Google such an attractive place to shop your patents that the most threatening patents that would otherwise get picked up by Google-hostile entities end up getting shopped to Google first.