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Because you want authorization and authentication by application. So a web server / proxy needs the public TLS cert but maybe an application server doesn't. Mea

Because you want authorization and authentication by application. So a web server / proxy needs the public TLS cert but maybe an application server doesn't. Meanwhile the app server needs DB credentials but the web server doesn't. In your scenario, if something happens to a front facing web server, nothing prevents the attacker to just enumerate all secrets and retrieve them, whether the server should have had access or not. Defense in depth is a thing.

IgorPartola 12y ago
I believe what you are describing can be built using the primitives I described. Vault, or another secrets manager, would only release secrets to severs on specific subnets. The front-end would be on your front-end subnet, the application server would be on the backend subnet, and the application server would not be authorized to access the private TLS key because it's on the wrong subnet for that particular secret.
- acveilleux 12y ago
  To some extent, that's true. The granularity is a bit lacking however. A bigger worry would be that the ability to spin up an host in a specific subnet is the effective authentication. It's not something I'd be comfortable with myself but I guess some people would be.
  - IgorPartola 12y ago
    If I get on your subnet with a host on which I have root, I can do a few things. First, I can now see any unencrypted traffic. Use MySQL? I can read that or even MIIT it. Use unencrypted LDAP? I can do the same. Basically you either assume your VPC is secure or it's not. This goes doubly so for servers on your network. Either, you assume that only authorized users have access to it or you don't. You have to draw the line in the sand somewhere and say "past this point it's secure". Now, I am not opposed to layers of security, but there are multiple options for how to define those, and assuming your network is secure isn't a far stretch on some platforms.
    - FireBeyond 12y ago
      Hmm, how many networks these days are unswitched? How are you going to see traffic that the switch doesn't send to you?
      - detaro 12y ago
        Active attacks, like ARP spoofing? Sure, there are environments where that won't work or will quickly be detected, but in many it will.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]

IgorPartola 12y ago

I believe what you are describing can be built using the primitives I described. Vault, or another secrets manager, would only release secrets to severs on specific subnets. The front-end would be on your front-end subnet, the application server would be on the backend subnet, and the application server would not be authorized to access the private TLS key because it's on the wrong subnet for that particular secret.

acveilleux 12y ago
To some extent, that's true. The granularity is a bit lacking however. A bigger worry would be that the ability to spin up an host in a specific subnet is the effective authentication. It's not something I'd be comfortable with myself but I guess some people would be.
- IgorPartola 12y ago
  If I get on your subnet with a host on which I have root, I can do a few things. First, I can now see any unencrypted traffic. Use MySQL? I can read that or even MIIT it. Use unencrypted LDAP? I can do the same. Basically you either assume your VPC is secure or it's not. This goes doubly so for servers on your network. Either, you assume that only authorized users have access to it or you don't. You have to draw the line in the sand somewhere and say "past this point it's secure". Now, I am not opposed to layers of security, but there are multiple options for how to define those, and assuming your network is secure isn't a far stretch on some platforms.
  - FireBeyond 12y ago
    Hmm, how many networks these days are unswitched? How are you going to see traffic that the switch doesn't send to you?
    - detaro 12y ago
      Active attacks, like ARP spoofing? Sure, there are environments where that won't work or will quickly be detected, but in many it will.
deleted 12y ago
[deleted]