The problem with comparing it to the Arianne 5 or Therac-25 is that those were situations where there was a single bug that you could blame. Toyota's software h

The problem with comparing it to the Arianne 5 or Therac-25 is that those were situations where there was a single bug that you could blame. Toyota's software had so many bugs that it was impossible /to/ tell what paths would lead to UA, just that there was no accountability and quality assurance. Regarding your second point, similar complaints were made about other safety features, like mandatory turn signals or airbags. Yes, there will be additional time spent ensuring that they are compliant with safety standards. But in this case, a lot of that time should have already been taking place. Some code needs more review time, a second or third or even fourth set of eyes on it. When people can die because of a bug, then the bar for what is acceptable code can and should be higher.