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No, with a merkle tree and bitcoin: https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitcoin_blockchain https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_roo
by tokenizerrr 12y ago
No, with a merkle tree and bitcoin: https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitcoin_blockchain https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitco...
- ikeboy 12y agoSo we're basically just trusting keybase.io to do verification, instead of the CA system, Why them and not anyone else?
- tokenizerrr 12y agoNo. We're not. We're trusting math.
- Sanddancer 12y agoTrusting math alone is not enough. One of the reasons the CA system works is that there is a person who can be in the loop when things go cactus. With things like keybase, if your certificate gets compromised, that's it, game over man, game over. CAs, you can get certs replaced and the compromised certificate becomes worthless. However, this does show the need for a generic method of certificate pinning. Using a DNS record type or the like would be able to add to the trust model, and make it much harder for a malicious actor to use a fake key, all without tying your trust database to a financial transaction.
- sarciszewski 12y ago> if your certificate gets compromised, that's it, game over man, game over. We must choose between either "compromised -> scorched earth" or "compromised -> social engineering jackpot".