> Also, I believe research has shown that the size of a fine has relatively little effect, and it is the perception of the certainty of being caught that is mos

> Also, I believe research has shown that the size of a fine has relatively little effect, and it is the perception of the certainty of being caught that is most effective as a deterrent. The original paper does note that the principle is limited to circumstances where catching is easy. What the paper doesn't account for, though, is response: which allows a straightforward general counter-strategy: The 'resistance' place a dummy wherever the 'police-state' target next -- to deceive or take the hit harmlessly. This simply turns the attack against itself: The police-state's strategy relies on: 1. announcing their next target; and 2. keeping that promise. The resistance exploits and completely negates that. To defeat that counter, the attack must disable itself. The critical assumption behind the police-state's strategy is that the resistance is powerless, that they have no ability to respond. But there is enough evidence this would be foolish in the internet world. If the police-state has technical means to find targets, the resistance has technical means to fool or dodge them.