3 ms·
From an email further down in the thread https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037553.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/
by sp332 12y ago
From an email further down in the thread https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037553.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/0...
While these relays account for 6% of the total number of exit relays, they only sum up to 2.7% of exit probability, which is what really matters.
Almost all of them were younger than one month and they seem to have joined the network in small batches.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037554.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/0...
the diversity here is interesting. My hunch is that we are looking at 38 popped boxes.... The question to me is: Do they all have something in common? What was the vector of compromise?
Curiously enough, they all run Debian stable (according to the SSH version string "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.0p1 Debian-4+deb7u2” ALL of them spit out on port 22 — no exception!).
- jwcrux 12y agoInteresting analysis. And that's absolutely correct, the exit probability is what makes the difference. It could be that they were all popped boxes running the same config, or it could be basic devops making sure all boxes setup have the same config. Both seem equally plausible, IMO.
- devicenull 12y agoI'd guess all of them are VPS instances. When you order a VPS, most hosts will run a full OS update before delivering it to you. (this is a feature of cloud-init, which is fairly standard) So, if you ordered all Debian instances at the same time, they'd all have the same SSH version string even if you didn't do anything special.
- unreal37 12y ago70 exit nodes less than a month old all running the exact same config doesn't seem like a state actor to me.
- jwcrux 12y agoLizardsquad had thousands of exit nodes spun up all running the exact same config. It doesn't take state actor effort to do this.
- sp332 12y agoAttacks like that are easy to spot and easy to shut down. New exit nodes gain trust over time, so having a bunch of brand-new nodes is not as useful as having a few dozen old, trusted nodes. This looks like an experiment, not an attempt to take over the network.
- matheweis 12y ago> While these relays account for 6% of the total number of exit relays, they only sum up to 2.7% of exit probability, which is what really matters. If that probability is on a per-tor-session basis, that is actually not very in favor of the user. My combinatorics are a bit rusty, but wouldn't your odds of being in the 2.7% increase significantly each time you use the tor network?
- sp332 12y agoAfter 25 times, you'd have a 50/50 chance of having gone through those nodes at least once.
- LunaSea 12y agoI don't think so because the chance of using a node is an independent event. So you will most likely have the same chance every time.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- sp332 12y agoRight! I mean cumulatively, after connecting 25 times, you have a 50/50 chance that at least one of those connections went through one of these nodes. (1 - 0.027) ^ 25 ~= 0.5
- tga_d 12y agoNit: I think that should be 1-(1-.0.27)^25 ~= 0.5. Obviously it ends up being about 1/2 either way, but you're measuring the chance that you used one of the nodes, not that you avoided all of them.
- garrettr_ 12y agoTor uses entry guards [0] to mitigate this kind of an attack. [0]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards