4 ms·
Voting is more complicated than it seems. Here are two rules I discovered about voting that are quite non-obvious: You can not print out a receipt of the vote
by ars 17y ago
Voting is more complicated than it seems.
Here are two rules I discovered about voting that are quite non-obvious:
You can not print out a receipt of the votes, in order. Because in a small town, someone could write down the order that people show up, and then correlate it with the order of votes on the receipt. (This is why paper trails of electronic votes were never implemented.)
The voter must never be given a receipt that allows a third party to verify who they voted for. This is because it allows vote buying: I buy votes, and you show me your receipt and prove you voted for who I want before getting paid.
This system fails the second rule, and thus will never be implemented widely.
- Dove 17y agoActually, it doesn't. The correlation between the revealed code and the selected candidate is not published.
- ars 17y agoYou are right - I quite missed that. Here's a slightly better article: http://discovermagazine.com/2008/oct/04-protecting-your-vote-with-invisible-ink http://discovermagazine.com/2008/oct/04-protecting-your-vote...
- by 17y agoBut there's a difference between "not being published" and not existing. Unpublished information is still available to some group of people, stored on disks etc. It could be accidentally or deliberately released. Given the amount of confidential information that does get inappropriately released I would expect this information to, at some point, be seen by people who shouldn't have access to it. Better that the files don't exist in the first place. Maybe it could be a probablistic correlation set at a level which would require a number of votes to obtain sufficient certainty.