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Reminds me of the paradox of the unexpected hanging: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_pa
by RiderOfGiraffes 17y ago
Reminds me of the paradox of the unexpected hanging:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox
Also, I believe research has shown that the size of a fine has relatively little effect, and it is the perception of the certainty of being caught that is most effective as a deterrent.
I agree with the others, people won't care, they'll do it anyway and feel secrure that they won't get caught. The few who do will have no effect on the vast majority.
Mass behavior isn't rational.
- MikeCapone 17y agoThanks for the link to the Hanging Paradox. I hadn't come across that one yet. Very interesting.
- hxa7241 17y ago> Also, I believe research has shown that the size of a fine has relatively little effect, and it is the perception of the certainty of being caught that is most effective as a deterrent. The original paper does note that the principle is limited to circumstances where catching is easy. What the paper doesn't account for, though, is response: which allows a straightforward general counter-strategy: The 'resistance' place a dummy wherever the 'police-state' target next -- to deceive or take the hit harmlessly. This simply turns the attack against itself: The police-state's strategy relies on: 1. announcing their next target; and 2. keeping that promise. The resistance exploits and completely negates that. To defeat that counter, the attack must disable itself. The critical assumption behind the police-state's strategy is that the resistance is powerless, that they have no ability to respond. But there is enough evidence this would be foolish in the internet world. If the police-state has technical means to find targets, the resistance has technical means to fool or dodge them.