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That's certainly part of it, but at some point there's a qualitative shift: if you make certificate lifetimes short enough, you don't need to bother with revoca
by geofft 12y ago
That's certainly part of it, but at some point there's a qualitative shift: if you make certificate lifetimes short enough, you don't need to bother with revocation lists at all. Since CRLs are unwieldy no matter how you do them, standard practice for revocation is OCSP, preferably through OCSP stapling, where you carry a signed response from the CA (valid for about a day) saying that your certificate hasn't been revoked. Effectively this is just a more complicated way of getting a new certificate about every day.
The other part is that, if something about a cert turns out to have been a bad idea, it's much better to only have to wait a few days or even months than to wait a few years. "Something" could be the algorithm (precisely why Chrome is yelling at SHA-1 certs that will still be valid in 2017, even though there's no attack as of right today). It could also be certification practices: if the community decides that, say, certificates without the `subjectAltName` extension need to be deprecated because the CN field is underspecified, nobody's going to want to do revocations for that. So you are stuck waiting until all current certs expire and get renewed to follow current best practices.