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I'm aware of Kuhn, but I think Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery is more germane to this discussion, particularly his distinction between logic of proof an

I'm aware of Kuhn, but I think Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery is more germane to this discussion, particularly his distinction between logic of proof and logic of discovery. Going back to your opinion poll example, there is no opinion about mixed marriages which is more "true" than any other. Even if scientific facts are approximative, they are at least rooted in physical reality; whereas opinions and norms simply relate to preferences and conventions. So I continue to maintain the truth of any assertion is independent of the identity of whoever formulates it, or more generally of the psychological and social context within which it arises. To deny this would be to deny that such a thing as truth exists. In which case any position, your own included, becomes indefensible.

wpietri 11y ago
I agree mostly but not completely; most people with opinions on interracial marriages at least claim to have some fact and/or reasoning behind them. I definitely agree agree that the truth of statements is notionally independent of the speaker. But in practice the truth of particular statements correlates well enough with things like the speaker's experience that we can use it as a handy evaluative heuristic. E.g., when a programmer and a manager both make statements about the technical merit of a particular approach, I will in practice be more likely to trust the programmer. Or if a real scientist and a bible-thumping young-earth creationist make assertions about the history of life on earth, I'm more likely to trust the scientist. This is a necessary heuristic for getting much done in the real world; we just don't each have time for evaluating all claims from first principles. But again, social policy is mainly determined by things that, in your construction, are opinion, not fact. So it would seem by your own model the sort of scientific give and take we are both fond of is mainly irrelevant to how mere opinions, and therefore our societies, get shaped with regard to social justice for groups who are currently disfavored by majority opinion.
- atlantic 11y ago
  I don't think truth can be crowd-sourced. It's as simple as that. I don't think the majority is always right, or even that it's right most of the time. Which doesn't mean I'm anti-democratic because (and I'll paraphrase Popper) while democracy is certainly a bad system, it is the least bad of all the available systems. I would certainly agree that matters of social policy fall firmly into the realm of what I would call opinion (doxa, to use Plato's terminology). But then our language should reflect that. Let's not talk about true and false, or even right and wrong. We can set up some kind of goal (for example, the utilitarian goal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number), and define good or bad, just or unjust, in relation to that predefined goal. But there is no epistemological basis here for truth. I have no objection to people using opinion as a basis for public policy - it could hardly go otherwise in a democracy - but then, let's recognize opinions for what they are and avoid turning certain currents of opinion into moral crusading that shuts down debate. If we are in a democracy, in the realm of pure opinion, then all opinions deserve a hearing, however much they clash with what seems obvious to us and to the group we identify with. To deny one group the right to articulate their opinion undermines the foundations of democracy.
  - wpietri 11y ago
    You can stop talking about right and wrong if you like. But the rest of us are comfortable using it for moral terms. If you think those things need a stronger epistemological basis, you are welcome to work on constructing that. > all opinions deserve a hearing If you believe that, then I'm sure you're out working for making sure the voiceless and downtrodden get their opinions heard. In addition to your time here arguing to make sure socially dominant groups get their already-familiar opinions heard yet more. I don't believe it, though. Here are some people expressing opinions: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Eckford#/media/File:Little_Rock_Desegregation_1957.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Eckford#/media/File:L... http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WBC_20051202_sacco-topeka5.jpg http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WBC_20051202_sacco-to... I don't think racist or homophobic opinions need to be heard more. That is not to suggest taking away their right to speak or publish. But their rights do not override the rights of other people to speak in response, or their right to freely assemble. To think otherwise is to confuse the standards of a particular kind of academic discourse with a much broader set of dialog. Major social change doesn't happen only through polite disagreement. That's especially true when the social changes are about the relative power of groups, and the way powerful groups maintain dominance through silencing people they don't like. America isn't free because we petitioned the king and he said, "Gosh, your points are reasonable." We fought. The slaves aren't free because the American South said, "Oh, now we see that these folks are equal." We fought. Women's suffrage, the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement: all of it involved a lot of shouting and major social unrest. Whatever you intend by it, applying your argument to any of these would have aided the continuance of oppression. And that's exactly how many people apply your argument today. So you can keep making it, but it's not going to convince me; as much as I like civil dialogue, I like civil rights more.
    - Karunamon 11y ago
      Your last comment strikes me as quite possibly the largest and most possibly damaging false dichotomy I've heard in a long, long time. This: as much as I like civil dialogue, I like civil rights more. If that's the way you actually think, to the letter, if this wasn't just a turn of phrase or perhaps not worded correctly on accident, you've very well scared the hell out of me. You've described your mindset as it's people on your side in one corner, and "civil dialogue" in the other, with the latter given short shrift because, as you well know, you are In the Right, and all of those people who want civil dialogue must therefore necessarily be In The Wrong because they are necessarily against $good_thing. This is fundamentally irrational, and the fact that you treat that as a badge of honor is hardly admirable. I'm archiving this thread.. perhaps someone else will be able to respond to this line of reasoning, because it's fundamentally alien to me.

wpietri 11y ago

I agree mostly but not completely; most people with opinions on interracial marriages at least claim to have some fact and/or reasoning behind them. I definitely agree agree that the truth of statements is notionally independent of the speaker. But in practice the truth of particular statements correlates well enough with things like the speaker's experience that we can use it as a handy evaluative heuristic. E.g., when a programmer and a manager both make statements about the technical merit of a particular approach, I will in practice be more likely to trust the programmer. Or if a real scientist and a bible-thumping young-earth creationist make assertions about the history of life on earth, I'm more likely to trust the scientist. This is a necessary heuristic for getting much done in the real world; we just don't each have time for evaluating all claims from first principles. But again, social policy is mainly determined by things that, in your construction, are opinion, not fact. So it would seem by your own model the sort of scientific give and take we are both fond of is mainly irrelevant to how mere opinions, and therefore our societies, get shaped with regard to social justice for groups who are currently disfavored by majority opinion.

atlantic 11y ago
I don't think truth can be crowd-sourced. It's as simple as that. I don't think the majority is always right, or even that it's right most of the time. Which doesn't mean I'm anti-democratic because (and I'll paraphrase Popper) while democracy is certainly a bad system, it is the least bad of all the available systems. I would certainly agree that matters of social policy fall firmly into the realm of what I would call opinion (doxa, to use Plato's terminology). But then our language should reflect that. Let's not talk about true and false, or even right and wrong. We can set up some kind of goal (for example, the utilitarian goal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number), and define good or bad, just or unjust, in relation to that predefined goal. But there is no epistemological basis here for truth. I have no objection to people using opinion as a basis for public policy - it could hardly go otherwise in a democracy - but then, let's recognize opinions for what they are and avoid turning certain currents of opinion into moral crusading that shuts down debate. If we are in a democracy, in the realm of pure opinion, then all opinions deserve a hearing, however much they clash with what seems obvious to us and to the group we identify with. To deny one group the right to articulate their opinion undermines the foundations of democracy.
- wpietri 11y ago
  You can stop talking about right and wrong if you like. But the rest of us are comfortable using it for moral terms. If you think those things need a stronger epistemological basis, you are welcome to work on constructing that. > all opinions deserve a hearing If you believe that, then I'm sure you're out working for making sure the voiceless and downtrodden get their opinions heard. In addition to your time here arguing to make sure socially dominant groups get their already-familiar opinions heard yet more. I don't believe it, though. Here are some people expressing opinions: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Eckford#/media/File:Little_Rock_Desegregation_1957.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Eckford#/media/File:L... http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WBC_20051202_sacco-topeka5.jpg http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WBC_20051202_sacco-to... I don't think racist or homophobic opinions need to be heard more. That is not to suggest taking away their right to speak or publish. But their rights do not override the rights of other people to speak in response, or their right to freely assemble. To think otherwise is to confuse the standards of a particular kind of academic discourse with a much broader set of dialog. Major social change doesn't happen only through polite disagreement. That's especially true when the social changes are about the relative power of groups, and the way powerful groups maintain dominance through silencing people they don't like. America isn't free because we petitioned the king and he said, "Gosh, your points are reasonable." We fought. The slaves aren't free because the American South said, "Oh, now we see that these folks are equal." We fought. Women's suffrage, the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement: all of it involved a lot of shouting and major social unrest. Whatever you intend by it, applying your argument to any of these would have aided the continuance of oppression. And that's exactly how many people apply your argument today. So you can keep making it, but it's not going to convince me; as much as I like civil dialogue, I like civil rights more.
  - Karunamon 11y ago
    Your last comment strikes me as quite possibly the largest and most possibly damaging false dichotomy I've heard in a long, long time. This: as much as I like civil dialogue, I like civil rights more. If that's the way you actually think, to the letter, if this wasn't just a turn of phrase or perhaps not worded correctly on accident, you've very well scared the hell out of me. You've described your mindset as it's people on your side in one corner, and "civil dialogue" in the other, with the latter given short shrift because, as you well know, you are In the Right, and all of those people who want civil dialogue must therefore necessarily be In The Wrong because they are necessarily against $good_thing. This is fundamentally irrational, and the fact that you treat that as a badge of honor is hardly admirable. I'm archiving this thread.. perhaps someone else will be able to respond to this line of reasoning, because it's fundamentally alien to me.