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> It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. Perhaps I should thank you, Thomas, for continuing to beat this

by danyork 12y ago

> It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. Perhaps I should thank you, Thomas, for continuing to beat this drum... because it shows extremely clearly how we need to educate more people and be MUCH more clear about exactly how the keys at the root of DNSSEC are maintained. If people fully understand the process, and how it was designed to NOT allow attackers in this way, we could spend our time on much more productive discussions. (Granted, documents such as https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt do NOT make for friendly reading.) Thank you for pointing out the work that needs to be done.

tptacek 12y ago
The idea that process and policy addresses this problem is wishful! By design and by law, the most popular and important TLDs are controlled by governments, and, particularly, the US and UK governments. The most popular generic TLD after COM/NET/ORG is IO, which is controlled by the world's most unhinged signals intelligence agency. You are advocating for a PKI that is literally shrink-wrapped around government-controlled namespaces. For a security protocol on the global Internet, that's an utterly unforced error. It boggles my mind that anyone had ever considered it, and I am thankful that it is a dead letter now.
- xorcist 12y ago
  But if NSA controls DNS, by extension they control the TLS CA tree as well. Because domain validated certificates is what everyone relies on for security. Again, that's the point. You keep pointing out that DNSSEC is somehow government controlled, when what you really mean is the entirety of DNS and CAs put together are, and not specifically just DNSSEC. That doesn't make for a constructive discussion since there is no context of an alternative system. Status quo still leaves us with easily falsified domain validated certificates. I can agree for the sake of discussion that the DNS and CA system is under government control. So against an intelligence organization with unlimited resources anything built on DNS or certificates would fall, so DNSSEC wouldn't help you there. But against every other attacker in the world it absolutely would (while making the attacks it can't defend against easier to detect).

by danyork 12y ago

tptacek 12y ago

The idea that process and policy addresses this problem is wishful! By design and by law, the most popular and important TLDs are controlled by governments, and, particularly, the US and UK governments. The most popular generic TLD after COM/NET/ORG is IO, which is controlled by the world's most unhinged signals intelligence agency. You are advocating for a PKI that is literally shrink-wrapped around government-controlled namespaces. For a security protocol on the global Internet, that's an utterly unforced error. It boggles my mind that anyone had ever considered it, and I am thankful that it is a dead letter now.

xorcist 12y ago
But if NSA controls DNS, by extension they control the TLS CA tree as well. Because domain validated certificates is what everyone relies on for security. Again, that's the point. You keep pointing out that DNSSEC is somehow government controlled, when what you really mean is the entirety of DNS and CAs put together are, and not specifically just DNSSEC. That doesn't make for a constructive discussion since there is no context of an alternative system. Status quo still leaves us with easily falsified domain validated certificates. I can agree for the sake of discussion that the DNS and CA system is under government control. So against an intelligence organization with unlimited resources anything built on DNS or certificates would fall, so DNSSEC wouldn't help you there. But against every other attacker in the world it absolutely would (while making the attacks it can't defend against easier to detect).