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But here's the thing - the root zone's private key for DNSSEC is not in one place. It is spread across a number of smart cards carried by a variety of individu
by danyork 12y ago
But here's the thing - the root zone's private key for DNSSEC is not in one place. It is spread across a number of smart cards carried by a variety of individuals spread around the world - specifically so that it could not be compromised by governments or others.
You can see for yourself exactly what kind of process takes place to use the root key to generate new Zone Signing Keys (ZSKs) every 3 months at the IANA key ceremonies: https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies
It would be an extremely difficult process for an intelligence agency to subvert, even one with essentially limitless resources.
- tptacek 12y agoBut domains under .COM are exactly as trustworthy as Verisign, right? The root key signing ceremonies are just theater, right?