colmmacc - I was thinking more of a case where the attacker is doing a MITM on your DNS info, i.e. getting between you and the DNS server authoritative for the

colmmacc - I was thinking more of a case where the attacker is doing a MITM on your DNS info, i.e. getting between you and the DNS server authoritative for the domain you want to connect to in order to redirect you to another site. My use of "modified in transit" was to the DNS query. Yes, "cache poisoning". Agree with your last point. DNSSEC only helps provide integrity validation down to the point of wherever the actual DNSSEC validation occurs. In the most secure form, that validation would occur on your actual device (i.e. the stub resolver) or in your application (some now are building DNSSEC validation in, ex. the Jitsi softphone). I know some folks who run Unbound (or DNSSEC-Trigger) on their laptops to have the validation occurring there. If you rely on the DNSSEC validation to occur at your ISP (ex. Comcast in the US) your zone of attack exposure is then your local network and the connection to your ISP... so yes, and attacker could potentially inject bogus responses there. If you rely on DNSSEC validation out at a public server such as Google's Public DNS... well... then your zone of exposure is much greater. This is where the work going on within the DPRIVE working group within the IETF is so important. They are developing mechanisms to secure the confidentiality and integrity of the connection between your stub resolver / client and the recursive resolver you use. With DPRIVE covering your connection, you could use a DNSSEC-validating resolver that was farther away from you.