3 ms·

The difference is not in the complexity of the code, but the magnitude of the attack. You would need to subvert every DNS request from a certain client, for the

by xorcist 12y ago

The difference is not in the complexity of the code, but the magnitude of the attack. You would need to subvert every DNS request from a certain client, for the duration of the TTL of all signature points. (Exactly how much harder it is depends on the circumstances, but a travelling target would be even harder than a well known stationary one, even if you control large parts of Internet infrastructure and is willing to use it.) But that's not the point. The only point is that between it and the SSL CA infrastructure, the latter is the one NSA has more control over and a much easier time generating certificates for, so the labelling the former "NSA controlled" is slightly disingenious.

tptacek 12y ago
You don't like the CA system. I don't either. I go farther, and say "it's a very bad idea to replace the CA system with another hierarchical PKI the top of which is controlled be NSA and GCHQ". I'm not sure I understand your rebuttal to that point.
- xorcist 12y ago
  Because it is not "controlled" by the NSA in any meaningful way (with emphasis on meaningful). Any such argument would be valid for pretty any global PKI system, if the argument is that they control important parts of the Internet infrastructure. The SSL CA system is even more controlled by the NSA as DNSSEC is. DNSSEC is much harder to circumvent than the SSL CA system, no matter how you look at it. So I do not mean to refute that the NSA controls the Internet, the CA system, and DNSSEC (even if I don't believe that's an accurate description). It is simply not a meaningful discussion to have. Even if the NSA can break the Internet, there are other use cases and it still carries great value for everyone.
  - tptacek 12y ago
    It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. The corporations that control the root are domiciled in the US. Google's remedy for misuse of any of those zones is to stop being GOOGLE.COM. This is a silly discussion.
    - danyork 12y ago
      > It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. Perhaps I should thank you, Thomas, for continuing to beat this drum... because it shows extremely clearly how we need to educate more people and be MUCH more clear about exactly how the keys at the root of DNSSEC are maintained. If people fully understand the process, and how it was designed to NOT allow attackers in this way, we could spend our time on much more productive discussions. (Granted, documents such as https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt do NOT make for friendly reading.) Thank you for pointing out the work that needs to be done.
      - tptacek 12y ago
        The idea that process and policy addresses this problem is wishful! By design and by law, the most popular and important TLDs are controlled by governments, and, particularly, the US and UK governments. The most popular generic TLD after COM/NET/ORG is IO, which is controlled by the world's most unhinged signals intelligence agency. You are advocating for a PKI that is literally shrink-wrapped around government-controlled namespaces. For a security protocol on the global Internet, that's an utterly unforced error. It boggles my mind that anyone had ever considered it, and I am thankful that it is a dead letter now.
        xorcist 12y ago
        But if NSA controls DNS, by extension they control the TLS CA tree as well. Because domain validated certificates is what everyone relies on for security. Again, that's the point. You keep pointing out that DNSSEC is somehow government controlled, when what you really mean is the entirety of DNS and CAs put together are, and not specifically just DNSSEC. That doesn't make for a constructive discussion since there is no context of an alternative system. Status quo still leaves us with easily falsified domain validated certificates. I can agree for the sake of discussion that the DNS and CA system is under government control. So against an intelligence organization with unlimited resources anything built on DNS or certificates would fall, so DNSSEC wouldn't help you there. But against every other attacker in the world it absolutely would (while making the attacks it can't defend against easier to detect).

by xorcist 12y ago

tptacek 12y ago

You don't like the CA system. I don't either. I go farther, and say "it's a very bad idea to replace the CA system with another hierarchical PKI the top of which is controlled be NSA and GCHQ". I'm not sure I understand your rebuttal to that point.

xorcist 12y ago
Because it is not "controlled" by the NSA in any meaningful way (with emphasis on meaningful). Any such argument would be valid for pretty any global PKI system, if the argument is that they control important parts of the Internet infrastructure. The SSL CA system is even more controlled by the NSA as DNSSEC is. DNSSEC is much harder to circumvent than the SSL CA system, no matter how you look at it. So I do not mean to refute that the NSA controls the Internet, the CA system, and DNSSEC (even if I don't believe that's an accurate description). It is simply not a meaningful discussion to have. Even if the NSA can break the Internet, there are other use cases and it still carries great value for everyone.
- tptacek 12y ago
  It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. The corporations that control the root are domiciled in the US. Google's remedy for misuse of any of those zones is to stop being GOOGLE.COM. This is a silly discussion.
  - danyork 12y ago
    > It's not controlled by NSA? The largest nodes in the tree are literally controlled by them. Perhaps I should thank you, Thomas, for continuing to beat this drum... because it shows extremely clearly how we need to educate more people and be MUCH more clear about exactly how the keys at the root of DNSSEC are maintained. If people fully understand the process, and how it was designed to NOT allow attackers in this way, we could spend our time on much more productive discussions. (Granted, documents such as https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt do NOT make for friendly reading.) Thank you for pointing out the work that needs to be done.
    - tptacek 12y ago
      The idea that process and policy addresses this problem is wishful! By design and by law, the most popular and important TLDs are controlled by governments, and, particularly, the US and UK governments. The most popular generic TLD after COM/NET/ORG is IO, which is controlled by the world's most unhinged signals intelligence agency. You are advocating for a PKI that is literally shrink-wrapped around government-controlled namespaces. For a security protocol on the global Internet, that's an utterly unforced error. It boggles my mind that anyone had ever considered it, and I am thankful that it is a dead letter now.
      - xorcist 12y ago
        But if NSA controls DNS, by extension they control the TLS CA tree as well. Because domain validated certificates is what everyone relies on for security. Again, that's the point. You keep pointing out that DNSSEC is somehow government controlled, when what you really mean is the entirety of DNS and CAs put together are, and not specifically just DNSSEC. That doesn't make for a constructive discussion since there is no context of an alternative system. Status quo still leaves us with easily falsified domain validated certificates. I can agree for the sake of discussion that the DNS and CA system is under government control. So against an intelligence organization with unlimited resources anything built on DNS or certificates would fall, so DNSSEC wouldn't help you there. But against every other attacker in the world it absolutely would (while making the attacks it can't defend against easier to detect).