1.a.1 I think this is your main fault. You are assuming that end-to-end encrypted message content is equatable to 'insecure' SMTP. The clear text or encrypte

1.a.1 I think this is your main fault. You are assuming that end-to-end encrypted message content is equatable to 'insecure' SMTP. The clear text or encrypted content of an email message has nothing to do with validating that an email account belongs to a domain and is valid. SPF validates that the email account holder is valid. DKIM signs the message and provides a body hash which is validated against the public key in DNS. DMARC allows the domain owner to say that the message should trashed or passed. And DNSSEC allows the DNS root to say that the sending domain is the sending domain. So -- I repeat -- with SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and DNSSEC email validated CA certificates are quite secure. And, yet, you are unwilling to admit this... I suggest you read the DKIM RFCs, particularly RFC5585 "2.3. Establishing Message Validity Though man-in-the-middle attacks are historically rare in email, it is nevertheless theoretically possible for a message to be modified during transit. An interesting side effect of the cryptographic method used by DKIM is that it is possible to be certain that a signed message (or, if l= is used, the signed portion of a message) has not been modified between the time of signing and the time of verifying. If it has been changed in any way, then the message will not be verified successfully with DKIM."