4 ms·
Yes, it absolutely does. If they actually use that CA to MITM connections, it is usually detected pretty quickly, and browsers quickly revoke that CA's trust.
by stouset 12y ago
Yes, it absolutely does. If they actually use that CA to MITM connections, it is usually detected pretty quickly, and browsers quickly revoke that CA's trust.
Even in a scenario where this doesn't happen, it elevates the required attack from a passive eavesdropping attack (which is comparatively simple to conduct en masse, and to analyze data retroactively) to an active attack (which must typically be done in a targeted, real-time fashion).
- lisper 12y ago> If they actually use that CA to MITM connections, it is usually detected pretty quickly Really? How?
- timothya 12y agoCertificate pinning [0] is a common way. [0]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Certificate_pinning http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Certif...
- lisper 12y agoRight. Because no one ever changes a certificate legitimately.
- stouset 12y agoSome people run TACK. Chrome also, IIRC, reports back on when certs have changed and Google can clearly see if there's widespread disagreement on what key is being served to visitors.
- lisper 12y agoHow is that going to help? If you've been MITMd then the attacker can intercept your TACK and Google traffic too.
- stouset 12y agoChrome pins the Google certs, so MITM will only work if you get the user before they've first downloaded Chrome. And then you have to ensure you only ever MITM those clients, or your attack will be detected. And TACK literally was designed to solve this problem. If the MITM interferes with you communicating to other TACK clients, you detect their attack. If they don't, you detect their attack.