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The article makes an interesting point about whether the later IPOs are leaving private capital bearing the risk rather than retail investors. It's basically co
by notahacker 12y ago
The article makes an interesting point about whether the later IPOs are leaving private capital bearing the risk rather than retail investors. It's basically correct about the beauty of SaaS, except for the obvious counter that high-margin businesses are a magnet for competition in the long run.
But it starts off with it's very worst argument, the ultimate '99 argument even: analysts suggesting Instagram's value increased 35-fold since acquisition based on the assumption that if it "fully monetized" it could contribute $2bn revenue (ie. at zero costs and zero discount rate you're still looking at a 17 year time horizon to get $35bn from Instagram, which is about three lifetimes for youth-oriented media properties) It suggests that's quite reasonable with reference to the stock price of yet-to-turn-a-profit Twitter.
It doesn't get any better when it suggests the "unicorns" are different because they're competing with non-tech-enabled businesses. That could have been a slide from the WebVan pitch deck. Plus it's very, very wrong in the case of AirBnB: Sabre et al sewed up a large chunk of the profitable end of the distribution market by solving the technical problems of filling hotel rooms, and locking themselves into the infrastructure, before the internet. AirBnB has a flair for consumer marketing, but does that really make it worth more?
The argument that the '99 companies failed because the mass of consumers didn't exist and the infrastructure wasn't ready is true, but for any self-respecting bear that's an indication of exactly why it could be worse than 99 when investors get cynical about companies peaking at hundreds of millions of users whilst still being unable to squeeze a respectable profit to justify their valuation.