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In Estonia the pressure issue is solved. One can vote as many times needed. When first vote was given under pressure, one can vote differently later. As many ti

by atirip 12y ago

In Estonia the pressure issue is solved. One can vote as many times needed. When first vote was given under pressure, one can vote differently later. As many times is needed. Internet voting is not possible on the voting day, only before. That assures that when one has no possibilty to vote without pressure in internet, one has possibility to vote traditionally. Traditional vote overturnes e-vote.

tomjen3 12y ago
Whats to prevent the government from checking who voted what then later on then?
- atirip 12y ago
  The best answer to this is probably that "the government" could run DNA tests on all the paper votes too...
  - pjc50 12y ago
    Doesn't need to be that complicated. The UK system has a (paper) record of ballot paper numbers.
  - jacques_chester 12y ago
    The difference is that this would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and require a flawless conspiracy of thousands of people. Versus one guy and a SELECT statement.
    - atirip 12y ago
      You do not have any idea whatsoever how those systems are built, do you? Everything is logged, and logs changes are logged and logs change logs are logged and all those logs are signed and when the logger looses connection to loggable, then this is logged too and that is logged too. And finally. The interest of knowing of who voted who is virtually zero. I admit that the principle of anonynous voting is good and needs to be guarded, but the real harm of leak is virtually zero too. The most bigger threat is manipulation of results.
      - mcherm 12y ago
        You have no idea whatsoever how these systems are built. You don't know because you haven't seen the software (or hardware) for them. You haven't because (I assume this part) you weren't one of the state inspectors, and what many (most?) of the manufacturers have done is to insist that no one ELSE be allowed to view the details since it's a "trade secret". So maybe there is excellent logging like you describe. And maybe there isn't. We DO know that there have been occasional incidents of invalid vote reporting by the machines (such as [1] or [2]) that were not caught by such log systems. [1] http://www.networkworld.com/article/2275174/lan-wan/e-voting-vendor--programming-errors-caused-dropped-votes.html http://www.networkworld.com/article/2275174/lan-wan/e-voting... [2] http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/ http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/
        atirip 12y ago
        Actually i have seen the software, here it is https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine
        pdkl95 12y ago
        You cast your vote at a github-hosted source code repository? As René Magritte might have put it, "Ce n'est pas le logiciel". You haven't seen the software - you've only seen source code that may resemble what is running when you cast your vote.
      - jacques_chester 12y ago
        I can't tell if you're kidding. And I don't really care what logs are kept, because any such log is one dodgy programmer, one bribed sysadmin, one lost private key away from being totally or partially compromised. The system we have works and would require the complete and flawless cooperation of thousands of conspirators -- including mutually hostile, cross-checking party officials -- to subvert the outcomes.
throwaway7767 12y ago
At some point, a decision has to be reached, right? You can't just decide ten years later that you changed your mind on some election issue expect to take your vote back. So if you're an evil person looking to pressure people to vote your way, you would make people prove their vote to you after it's too late to change it. Or, if it's not possible to verify the vote later (I believe it is possible in the estonian system), you'd make them vote at the last minute. Am I misunderstanding something here? I don't see how this issue has been solved.
- atirip 12y ago
  Yes, there is a method to verify your vote. But as i said, e-voting is in advance only. On the voting day only traditional voting is possible, traditional vote voids e-vote. E-vote can be changed only when e-voting is active, not later. And yes, one could prevent someone to go and vote traditionally, but this is out of the scope of e-voting. There are myriad of methods how to manipulate traditional voting. And your hypothetical case is really a kidnapping, criminal offence, not scalable.
  - throwaway7767 12y ago
    That's a reasonable approach, though of course it means that you can never have a 100% e-voting system as the security of the thing is contingent on there being a regular paper ballot. > And your hypothetical case is really a kidnapping, criminal offence, not scalable. No, there is no need for kidnapping. Human relationships are complicated and pressure can be applied in many ways. A spouse, father, or other person can influence people in his direct vicinity. The secret ballot and requirment that only one person enters the voting booth at a time ensures that that influence does not extend to the election result.

by atirip 12y ago

tomjen3 12y ago

Whats to prevent the government from checking who voted what then later on then?

atirip 12y ago
The best answer to this is probably that "the government" could run DNA tests on all the paper votes too...
- pjc50 12y ago
  Doesn't need to be that complicated. The UK system has a (paper) record of ballot paper numbers.
- jacques_chester 12y ago
  The difference is that this would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and require a flawless conspiracy of thousands of people. Versus one guy and a SELECT statement.
  - atirip 12y ago
    You do not have any idea whatsoever how those systems are built, do you? Everything is logged, and logs changes are logged and logs change logs are logged and all those logs are signed and when the logger looses connection to loggable, then this is logged too and that is logged too. And finally. The interest of knowing of who voted who is virtually zero. I admit that the principle of anonynous voting is good and needs to be guarded, but the real harm of leak is virtually zero too. The most bigger threat is manipulation of results.
    - mcherm 12y ago
      You have no idea whatsoever how these systems are built. You don't know because you haven't seen the software (or hardware) for them. You haven't because (I assume this part) you weren't one of the state inspectors, and what many (most?) of the manufacturers have done is to insist that no one ELSE be allowed to view the details since it's a "trade secret". So maybe there is excellent logging like you describe. And maybe there isn't. We DO know that there have been occasional incidents of invalid vote reporting by the machines (such as [1] or [2]) that were not caught by such log systems. [1] http://www.networkworld.com/article/2275174/lan-wan/e-voting-vendor--programming-errors-caused-dropped-votes.html http://www.networkworld.com/article/2275174/lan-wan/e-voting... [2] http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/ http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/
      - atirip 12y ago
        Actually i have seen the software, here it is https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine
        pdkl95 12y ago
        You cast your vote at a github-hosted source code repository? As René Magritte might have put it, "Ce n'est pas le logiciel". You haven't seen the software - you've only seen source code that may resemble what is running when you cast your vote.
    - jacques_chester 12y ago
      I can't tell if you're kidding. And I don't really care what logs are kept, because any such log is one dodgy programmer, one bribed sysadmin, one lost private key away from being totally or partially compromised. The system we have works and would require the complete and flawless cooperation of thousands of conspirators -- including mutually hostile, cross-checking party officials -- to subvert the outcomes.

throwaway7767 12y ago

At some point, a decision has to be reached, right? You can't just decide ten years later that you changed your mind on some election issue expect to take your vote back. So if you're an evil person looking to pressure people to vote your way, you would make people prove their vote to you after it's too late to change it. Or, if it's not possible to verify the vote later (I believe it is possible in the estonian system), you'd make them vote at the last minute. Am I misunderstanding something here? I don't see how this issue has been solved.

atirip 12y ago
Yes, there is a method to verify your vote. But as i said, e-voting is in advance only. On the voting day only traditional voting is possible, traditional vote voids e-vote. E-vote can be changed only when e-voting is active, not later. And yes, one could prevent someone to go and vote traditionally, but this is out of the scope of e-voting. There are myriad of methods how to manipulate traditional voting. And your hypothetical case is really a kidnapping, criminal offence, not scalable.
- throwaway7767 12y ago
  That's a reasonable approach, though of course it means that you can never have a 100% e-voting system as the security of the thing is contingent on there being a regular paper ballot. > And your hypothetical case is really a kidnapping, criminal offence, not scalable. No, there is no need for kidnapping. Human relationships are complicated and pressure can be applied in many ways. A spouse, father, or other person can influence people in his direct vicinity. The secret ballot and requirment that only one person enters the voting booth at a time ensures that that influence does not extend to the election result.