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I don't know why you're talking about hard-coding and simulation and whatnot. The mechanism that the predictor uses is completely irrelevant and specifically de

I don't know why you're talking about hard-coding and simulation and whatnot. The mechanism that the predictor uses is completely irrelevant and specifically defined to be unknown in the thought experiment description, aside from it disallowing backwards causality and things like time travel. Every single person who picked only box B left $1000 on the table. That's a bare fact. You don't even need to know or care what the prediction is to know that. In general when someone leaves $1000 that they could have had, no strings attached, that's a less desirable outcome than the one where they had the extra $1000.

Retric 12y ago
Your assuming it's impossible to accurately predict what someone would chose when it's directly stated they can. If your the kind of person that picks AB then you get 1,000. If your the kind of person that picks B you get 1,000,000. There are no other options. PS: Consider, the 'prediction' is having you walk on stage and given the choice a random number of times greater than 20. Except, one of them will be randomly the one that counts.
- empthought 12y ago
  I'm not saying it's impossible to predict anything. I'm saying that people whose choose box B are always choosing the inferior of the two options available to them, because the money is already on the table and no one is going to change that configuration based on the person's choice (stated in the problem). As I have said, the prediction method or accuracy is largely irrelevant to the actual paradox, aside from a means to incentivize people to behave in an obviously irrational way :). (I don't really think that, the other principle of decision for one-boxers is induction based on prior observations. The whole point of the paradox is neither side has a decisive argument against the other. The important point here is that free will/determinism, possibility of perfect simulation, etc. are not part of the problem this paradox is intended to illuminate.)
  - Retric 12y ago
    "I'm saying that people whose choose box B are always choosing the inferior of the two options available to them" Except there are two occasions to chose B. On is on the stage and the other is as part of the model the predictor uses. And in that case you really want to be modeled as someone that chooses B. In the end what happens on stage is irrelevant as 99.9% of the value comes from how your modeled .1% comes from what you do on stage. So, how do you get modeled as someone that chooses B? Well, if their accurate the only way to influence that prediction is choosing B on stage. And yes, with accurate modeling information can travel backward in time. Just consider people taking an umbrella to work because of a weather prediction. In this case the rain caused people to bring an umbrella before it happened. Now, you can argue that picking AB is the rational choice, but if it consistently get's a worse outcome then it's irrational behavior. What makes it irrational? The assumption it can't influence what's under the table. PS: The only counter argument is you have 'free will' and thus your choices can't be accurately modeled.
    - empthought 12y ago
      > And yes, with accurate modeling information can travel backward in time. Just consider people taking an umbrella to work because of a weather prediction. In this case the rain caused people to bring an umbrella before it happened. The rain didn't cause this; ️the prediction of rain did. Comments like this, and your strange focus on simulation and modeling, lead me to believe that you are a little out of your element here. The questions raised and the paradox regarding choice are present no matter what the predictor's mechanism is, whether it is a perfect simulation or psychic connection with your mind, or messages from God.
      - Retric 12y ago
        Rain has no free will. In the face of a completely accurate prediction neither do you. And without free will the decision has already been made before you where on the stage. Even if you where not aware that you had made the choice otherwise you could not be 100% accurately modeled. PS: The implications of not having free will are uncomfortable, but they directly fall out of having a completely accurate predictor. (And yes, this is often weakened to a semi accurate predictor.)

Retric 12y ago

Your assuming it's impossible to accurately predict what someone would chose when it's directly stated they can. If your the kind of person that picks AB then you get 1,000. If your the kind of person that picks B you get 1,000,000. There are no other options. PS: Consider, the 'prediction' is having you walk on stage and given the choice a random number of times greater than 20. Except, one of them will be randomly the one that counts.

empthought 12y ago
I'm not saying it's impossible to predict anything. I'm saying that people whose choose box B are always choosing the inferior of the two options available to them, because the money is already on the table and no one is going to change that configuration based on the person's choice (stated in the problem). As I have said, the prediction method or accuracy is largely irrelevant to the actual paradox, aside from a means to incentivize people to behave in an obviously irrational way :). (I don't really think that, the other principle of decision for one-boxers is induction based on prior observations. The whole point of the paradox is neither side has a decisive argument against the other. The important point here is that free will/determinism, possibility of perfect simulation, etc. are not part of the problem this paradox is intended to illuminate.)
- Retric 12y ago
  "I'm saying that people whose choose box B are always choosing the inferior of the two options available to them" Except there are two occasions to chose B. On is on the stage and the other is as part of the model the predictor uses. And in that case you really want to be modeled as someone that chooses B. In the end what happens on stage is irrelevant as 99.9% of the value comes from how your modeled .1% comes from what you do on stage. So, how do you get modeled as someone that chooses B? Well, if their accurate the only way to influence that prediction is choosing B on stage. And yes, with accurate modeling information can travel backward in time. Just consider people taking an umbrella to work because of a weather prediction. In this case the rain caused people to bring an umbrella before it happened. Now, you can argue that picking AB is the rational choice, but if it consistently get's a worse outcome then it's irrational behavior. What makes it irrational? The assumption it can't influence what's under the table. PS: The only counter argument is you have 'free will' and thus your choices can't be accurately modeled.
  - empthought 12y ago
    > And yes, with accurate modeling information can travel backward in time. Just consider people taking an umbrella to work because of a weather prediction. In this case the rain caused people to bring an umbrella before it happened. The rain didn't cause this; ️the prediction of rain did. Comments like this, and your strange focus on simulation and modeling, lead me to believe that you are a little out of your element here. The questions raised and the paradox regarding choice are present no matter what the predictor's mechanism is, whether it is a perfect simulation or psychic connection with your mind, or messages from God.
    - Retric 12y ago
      Rain has no free will. In the face of a completely accurate prediction neither do you. And without free will the decision has already been made before you where on the stage. Even if you where not aware that you had made the choice otherwise you could not be 100% accurately modeled. PS: The implications of not having free will are uncomfortable, but they directly fall out of having a completely accurate predictor. (And yes, this is often weakened to a semi accurate predictor.)