3 ms·
> you'd need to build an expensive (but potentially feasible) rainbow table of possible scrypt output I don't think that's feasible. "Expensive" is an understa
by ademarre 12y ago
> you'd need to build an expensive (but potentially feasible) rainbow table of possible scrypt output
I don't think that's feasible. "Expensive" is an understatement. To compute the rainbow table you need to do the work of actually calculating the scrypt output for each password, even though you don't have to store it. The space is just too big, therefore the time cost.
- emn13 12y agoIt's a question of size - clearly a rainbow table of 1 is feasible. I'm guessing a rainbow table of a million won't be too expensive either, and with a million common passwords, you'd likely crack something. But yeah, it's not likely to be a major threat. In any case, salting makes it irrelevant.
- ademarre 12y agoIs scrypt even implemented without a salt? If not, then it doesn't matter. And if so, why?
- emn13 12y agoGood point - it is implemented with a salt! However, the way that's done depends on the implemetation. The underlying KDF doesn't require nor generate a salt, so if you're implementing it client side, you'd need to ensure salting works.