5 ms·

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort

by na85 12y ago

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows. The damage to the US economy seems minimal in light of the Snowden leaks that implicate nearly every US-based technology company, and Microsoft is investing heavily into things like X-box to diversify their revenue streams. I don't think there'd be any fallout worth mentioning, tbh. When I put myself into the shoes of the DIRNSA and ask myself these questions, backdooring Windows seems like an obvious "Yes". _NSAKEY may very well not be a backdoor, but I find the suggestion that Windows doesn't contain one to be laughably naive.

tptacek 12y ago
Whether NSA explicitly backdoored WinNT or simply knew so much about its vulnerability that they didn't need to, we can all safely stipulate that the agency had extrajudicial and coercive access to every networked WinNT system on the Internet. But NSAKEY isn't that.
skolor 12y ago
So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put it there. If its an exploit, its a hell of a lot harder to point that finger at anyone in particular. [1]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html
- mynameisvlad 12y ago
  Bingo, or even creating their own exploit and releasing it in a way that does not tie back to them. Realistically, a backdoor is the worst option for the NSA. A backdoor would be known by the people who implemented it, who, assuming it's a cooperative venture, would most likely be at the company itself. A backdoor would also be most likely living in the real codebase, able to be discovered by others, and, if somehow it leaks, it'll point directly at the NSA. An exploit does not live in the codebase, could be blamed on others, and will produce the same results.
- na85 12y ago
  Exploits get fixed.
- philtar 12y ago
  You talk like they're different things. This is something the Chinese do. Leave the backdoor as a vulnerability. Sure other people may find it, but that means they have access to it from the git-go (on another note, this should be how you initialize repos in git) That way when someone finds it, they could go "oops. thanks for pointing this vulnerability out for us. Will fix"
  - skolor 12y ago
    That gives you the worst of both worlds, though. You get the major developmental downside of a backdoor - making sure no one in the development pipeline finds and removes it - while still having to do the non-trivial work of actually exploiting the bug. Admittedly I don't have real experience with the 0-day black market, but the internet tells me I can just show up with $200k and buy a Chrome/Windows/iOS 0-day, if I know the right people. I find it hard to believe its actually cheaper or even easier to backdoor software than it is to just buy the exploits.
mynameisvlad 12y ago
> I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows You drastically overestimate the general public's perception. I guarantee you that if you go down the street and ask random people if they trust Windows, they will say yes (or no, and say they trust OSX instead). In HN-land, sure, that can be assumed, but I highly doubt that viewpoint is shared outside tech circles.
fabulist 12y ago
I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case keeping the operation under wraps would be even more laborious. Snowden is proof that people who sign contracts are still capable of disclosing secrets. It is worth it for the NSA to backdoor crypto because, if the implementation is solid and the keys can't be stolen, then no matter how many resources they pour into cracking it the math will remain inflexible. There is no computer in the world with that kind of security. If it is smartly configured, they'll use 0day. If its airgapped, they'll compromise a sysadmin's computer and wait for them to connect to it (think Stuxnet.) If that isn't feasible, they'll walk into the data center and put malicious hardware into a PCI slot. If we persist in thinking of the NSA as a boogeyman logging every packet and backdooring every OS, rather than discussing their real capabilities and motivations - what they are, what they should be - we will become paralyzed to act against them, they will continue to operate without meaningful oversight, and our rights to privacy and to secure software will languish.
- na85 12y ago
  "A backdoor in Windows' TLS implementation" absolutely falls under the definition of "A backdoor in Windows".
  - fabulist 12y ago
    Fair enough.
- TheDong 12y ago
  I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH. Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken. Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We can use OpenBSD and have a higher confidence that it's not backdoored. The first step to reeling in the unchecked power of the NSA is not to claim that they would not have done such a simple thing but to realize exactly how atrocious the scope of their acts are - not to become paralyzed with fear, but to incite change.

by na85 12y ago

tptacek 12y ago

Whether NSA explicitly backdoored WinNT or simply knew so much about its vulnerability that they didn't need to, we can all safely stipulate that the agency had extrajudicial and coercive access to every networked WinNT system on the Internet. But NSAKEY isn't that.

skolor 12y ago

So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put it there. If its an exploit, its a hell of a lot harder to point that finger at anyone in particular. [1]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html

mynameisvlad 12y ago
Bingo, or even creating their own exploit and releasing it in a way that does not tie back to them. Realistically, a backdoor is the worst option for the NSA. A backdoor would be known by the people who implemented it, who, assuming it's a cooperative venture, would most likely be at the company itself. A backdoor would also be most likely living in the real codebase, able to be discovered by others, and, if somehow it leaks, it'll point directly at the NSA. An exploit does not live in the codebase, could be blamed on others, and will produce the same results.
na85 12y ago
Exploits get fixed.
philtar 12y ago
You talk like they're different things. This is something the Chinese do. Leave the backdoor as a vulnerability. Sure other people may find it, but that means they have access to it from the git-go (on another note, this should be how you initialize repos in git) That way when someone finds it, they could go "oops. thanks for pointing this vulnerability out for us. Will fix"
- skolor 12y ago
  That gives you the worst of both worlds, though. You get the major developmental downside of a backdoor - making sure no one in the development pipeline finds and removes it - while still having to do the non-trivial work of actually exploiting the bug. Admittedly I don't have real experience with the 0-day black market, but the internet tells me I can just show up with $200k and buy a Chrome/Windows/iOS 0-day, if I know the right people. I find it hard to believe its actually cheaper or even easier to backdoor software than it is to just buy the exploits.

mynameisvlad 12y ago

> I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows You drastically overestimate the general public's perception. I guarantee you that if you go down the street and ask random people if they trust Windows, they will say yes (or no, and say they trust OSX instead). In HN-land, sure, that can be assumed, but I highly doubt that viewpoint is shared outside tech circles.

fabulist 12y ago

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case keeping the operation under wraps would be even more laborious. Snowden is proof that people who sign contracts are still capable of disclosing secrets. It is worth it for the NSA to backdoor crypto because, if the implementation is solid and the keys can't be stolen, then no matter how many resources they pour into cracking it the math will remain inflexible. There is no computer in the world with that kind of security. If it is smartly configured, they'll use 0day. If its airgapped, they'll compromise a sysadmin's computer and wait for them to connect to it (think Stuxnet.) If that isn't feasible, they'll walk into the data center and put malicious hardware into a PCI slot. If we persist in thinking of the NSA as a boogeyman logging every packet and backdooring every OS, rather than discussing their real capabilities and motivations - what they are, what they should be - we will become paralyzed to act against them, they will continue to operate without meaningful oversight, and our rights to privacy and to secure software will languish.

na85 12y ago
"A backdoor in Windows' TLS implementation" absolutely falls under the definition of "A backdoor in Windows".
- fabulist 12y ago
  Fair enough.
TheDong 12y ago
I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH. Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken. Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We can use OpenBSD and have a higher confidence that it's not backdoored. The first step to reeling in the unchecked power of the NSA is not to claim that they would not have done such a simple thing but to realize exactly how atrocious the scope of their acts are - not to become paralyzed with fear, but to incite change.