5 ms·

A buddy who is an excellent reverse engineer assures me that this isn't a conspiracy. Crypto services had to be verified by a key; the NSA's crypto services wer

A buddy who is an excellent reverse engineer assures me that this isn't a conspiracy. Crypto services had to be verified by a key; the NSA's crypto services were classified, so they couldn't let Microsoft sign them; therefore, they needed their own key. The key is only used to authenticate crypto services, which I think Douglas Adams would describe as Mostly Harmless. I don't have the reverse engineering skills/IDA Pro license to verify this, but fwiw I trust and respect this person's skills. But lets do a thought experiment. 1. How much would the NSA gain from pressuring Microsoft into backdooring (or as they say, "enabling") Windows, in terms of systems they could not access before that they can access now? 2. How much would it cost the NSA, in terms of effort, good will, and exposure to risk by the people at Microsoft who would know about the backdoor and may leak or abuse it? How bad would it be if the public got wind of it? How hard would it be to keep it secret over the years, especially as engineers moved around to other companies? Would they have to involve foreign nationals on the dev team? Could they be trusted not to warn their governments? 3. How many times could they abuse their backdoor before it was obvious Windows couldn't be trusted? When/if that happened, what would be the damage to the US economy, and to their ability to penetrate systems? When I put myself in the shoes of DIRNSA and ask myself these questions, backdooring Windows (at least through official channels, like _NSAKEY supposedly is) seems like an insane proposition.

na85 12y ago
Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows. The damage to the US economy seems minimal in light of the Snowden leaks that implicate nearly every US-based technology company, and Microsoft is investing heavily into things like X-box to diversify their revenue streams. I don't think there'd be any fallout worth mentioning, tbh. When I put myself into the shoes of the DIRNSA and ask myself these questions, backdooring Windows seems like an obvious "Yes". _NSAKEY may very well not be a backdoor, but I find the suggestion that Windows doesn't contain one to be laughably naive.
- tptacek 12y ago
  Whether NSA explicitly backdoored WinNT or simply knew so much about its vulnerability that they didn't need to, we can all safely stipulate that the agency had extrajudicial and coercive access to every networked WinNT system on the Internet. But NSAKEY isn't that.
- skolor 12y ago
  So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put it there. If its an exploit, its a hell of a lot harder to point that finger at anyone in particular. [1]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html
  - mynameisvlad 12y ago
    Bingo, or even creating their own exploit and releasing it in a way that does not tie back to them. Realistically, a backdoor is the worst option for the NSA. A backdoor would be known by the people who implemented it, who, assuming it's a cooperative venture, would most likely be at the company itself. A backdoor would also be most likely living in the real codebase, able to be discovered by others, and, if somehow it leaks, it'll point directly at the NSA. An exploit does not live in the codebase, could be blamed on others, and will produce the same results.
  - na85 12y ago
    Exploits get fixed.
  - philtar 12y ago
    You talk like they're different things. This is something the Chinese do. Leave the backdoor as a vulnerability. Sure other people may find it, but that means they have access to it from the git-go (on another note, this should be how you initialize repos in git) That way when someone finds it, they could go "oops. thanks for pointing this vulnerability out for us. Will fix"

na85 12y ago

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows. The damage to the US economy seems minimal in light of the Snowden leaks that implicate nearly every US-based technology company, and Microsoft is investing heavily into things like X-box to diversify their revenue streams. I don't think there'd be any fallout worth mentioning, tbh. When I put myself into the shoes of the DIRNSA and ask myself these questions, backdooring Windows seems like an obvious "Yes". _NSAKEY may very well not be a backdoor, but I find the suggestion that Windows doesn't contain one to be laughably naive.

tptacek 12y ago
Whether NSA explicitly backdoored WinNT or simply knew so much about its vulnerability that they didn't need to, we can all safely stipulate that the agency had extrajudicial and coercive access to every networked WinNT system on the Internet. But NSAKEY isn't that.
skolor 12y ago
So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put it there. If its an exploit, its a hell of a lot harder to point that finger at anyone in particular. [1]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html
- mynameisvlad 12y ago
  Bingo, or even creating their own exploit and releasing it in a way that does not tie back to them. Realistically, a backdoor is the worst option for the NSA. A backdoor would be known by the people who implemented it, who, assuming it's a cooperative venture, would most likely be at the company itself. A backdoor would also be most likely living in the real codebase, able to be discovered by others, and, if somehow it leaks, it'll point directly at the NSA. An exploit does not live in the codebase, could be blamed on others, and will produce the same results.
- na85 12y ago
  Exploits get fixed.
- philtar 12y ago
  You talk like they're different things. This is something the Chinese do. Leave the backdoor as a vulnerability. Sure other people may find it, but that means they have access to it from the git-go (on another note, this should be how you initialize repos in git) That way when someone finds it, they could go "oops. thanks for pointing this vulnerability out for us. Will fix"