4 ms·

I agree in general, but in this specific case, Beijing can just demand access to Baidu's private keys and MITM all traffic passing through the GFWoC.

by KMag 12y ago

im2w1l 12y ago
That would be the death of Baidu among the Chinese diaspora.
- Kiwikwi 12y ago
  Buh? Encryption is de-facto illegal in China. To the extent SSL is used, you can be sure that the government already has a copy of the master key. I've worked on Chinese deployed train systems, and we were banned from encrypting train control signals (signing was allowed, though), just in case someone might try to sneak in a political message in an ATO control telegram...
  - im2w1l 12y ago
    Not breaking encryption itself. Breaking encryption to serve malicious scripts.
    - icebraining 12y ago
      So breaking encryption is accepted; serving malicious scripts is accepted (it's what happened in this attack), but breaking encryption to serve malicious scripts would be out of limits? That doesn't make much sense.
      - im2w1l 12y ago
        Serving malicious scripts is very bad, and may not actually be accepted. I know I would hesitate to use baidu analytics after this. But people might come around if they say something about SSL and wont happen again. If the encryption is then broken and it is done again, then a) it will prove that China did it. Because you can see who signed the certificate. b) it will prove that technical countermeasures are not enough, since the problem is deeper than that.
  - Estragon 12y ago
    Why is encrypting train control signals a good idea? What reasons were given for the ban?
    - KMag 12y ago
      > Why is encrypting train control signals a good idea? Because someone might like to mess with train signals, and in the off chance that some weakness is found in the MAC/signature scheme you're using, forcing an attacker to guess at which messages they're manipulating and how will make their attack more difficult. If you're working with a networked application, even if it's on a non-public network, you should be asking yourself "why not encrypt?" instead of "why encrypt?". This is doubly true of critical infrastructure that's expensive and slow to replace.
rmc 12y ago
Chinese government already has a root CA in all browsers.
- KMag 12y ago
  > Chinese government* already has a root CA in all* * browsers. * For definitions of "Chinese government" that includes the Beijing non-profit China Internet Network Information Center, which isn't technically part of the government, but presumably is easily pressured. * * For definitions of "all browsers" that excludes some minority browsers and those browsers run by users who have disabled the CNNIC root cert. I have no doubt that the Chinese government has access to the CCNIC root certificate private key if it so chooses, but demanding the private key for an existing domain certificate would provide slightly less traceability and slightly more deniability.

I agree in general, but in this specific case, Beijing can just demand access to Baidu's private keys and MITM all traffic passing through the GFWoC.

by KMag 12y ago

I agree in general, but in this specific case, Beijing can just demand access to Baidu's private keys and MITM all traffic passing through the GFWoC.

im2w1l 12y ago

That would be the death of Baidu among the Chinese diaspora.

Kiwikwi 12y ago
Buh? Encryption is de-facto illegal in China. To the extent SSL is used, you can be sure that the government already has a copy of the master key. I've worked on Chinese deployed train systems, and we were banned from encrypting train control signals (signing was allowed, though), just in case someone might try to sneak in a political message in an ATO control telegram...
- im2w1l 12y ago
  Not breaking encryption itself. Breaking encryption to serve malicious scripts.
  - icebraining 12y ago
    So breaking encryption is accepted; serving malicious scripts is accepted (it's what happened in this attack), but breaking encryption to serve malicious scripts would be out of limits? That doesn't make much sense.
    - im2w1l 12y ago
      Serving malicious scripts is very bad, and may not actually be accepted. I know I would hesitate to use baidu analytics after this. But people might come around if they say something about SSL and wont happen again. If the encryption is then broken and it is done again, then a) it will prove that China did it. Because you can see who signed the certificate. b) it will prove that technical countermeasures are not enough, since the problem is deeper than that.
- Estragon 12y ago
  Why is encrypting train control signals a good idea? What reasons were given for the ban?
  - KMag 12y ago
    > Why is encrypting train control signals a good idea? Because someone might like to mess with train signals, and in the off chance that some weakness is found in the MAC/signature scheme you're using, forcing an attacker to guess at which messages they're manipulating and how will make their attack more difficult. If you're working with a networked application, even if it's on a non-public network, you should be asking yourself "why not encrypt?" instead of "why encrypt?". This is doubly true of critical infrastructure that's expensive and slow to replace.

rmc 12y ago

Chinese government already has a root CA in all browsers.

KMag 12y ago
> Chinese government* already has a root CA in all* * browsers. * For definitions of "Chinese government" that includes the Beijing non-profit China Internet Network Information Center, which isn't technically part of the government, but presumably is easily pressured. * * For definitions of "all browsers" that excludes some minority browsers and those browsers run by users who have disabled the CNNIC root cert. I have no doubt that the Chinese government has access to the CCNIC root certificate private key if it so chooses, but demanding the private key for an existing domain certificate would provide slightly less traceability and slightly more deniability.