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> where internal processes and methods are paramount I don't buy that. Process is CYA first and foremost. If something happens, you get to say, "We adhere to t
by humanrebar 12y ago
> where internal processes and methods are paramount
I don't buy that. Process is CYA first and foremost. If something happens, you get to say, "We adhere to the strictest processes and best practices... blah, blah, blah."
Was there a lack of process in the space shuttle disasters? The flight 9525 crash? The Titanic?
You want safety? Get a third party (insurer, certification body, etc.) to assume responsibility (financial, legal, political, etc.) if anything goes wrong, regardless of the root cause. You might not get perfect safety, but you'll get responsibility, which is the next best thing.
Rigid processes are about diffusing responsibility, not taking it.
- panzagl 12y agoExistence of process does not mean the process is correct. Process failure was a big part of the shuttle crashes.
- humanrebar 12y agoBy that definition, everything is a process mistake and the term has no meaning.
- panzagl 12y agoYou're right, everything should be done by engineering ninja rockstars, and process is just what unawesome people use to keep their jobs.
- pyre 12y agoWell, you're ignoring blind adherence to process. E.g. it doesn't matter how good an idea is in a 'traditional' Japanese company, if the person presenting it doesn't have seniority, it will be ignored.
- LoSboccacc 12y agowasn't it management meddling? process called for redesigning the challenger oring, as corrosion was triple than expected, and process called for inspecting the columbia tiles. you can find all of these details in the reports, and you can find the name of the managers overriding engineering processes in both instances. challanger: http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/12722.aspx http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/12722.aspx http://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPage/tabid/85/ArticleID/170/The-Space-Shuttle-Challenger-Disaster.aspx http://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPage/tabid/85/Art... columbia: http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=9fe7f63a-d780-403a-adcf-a51622a8a9cf http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=9fe7f... (notice that engineering requested hard photographic data to assess the damage, and her used gut feeling)
- xenophonf 12y agoThose were _great_ links. "A Management Decision Overrides a Recommendation Not to Launch" was just infuriating, especially when all of the presented options lead to "there's basically nothing you can do". I can't even begin to imagine what the engineers felt when Challenger exploded. It's bad enough when there's some accident, but it's a whole new level of tragedy when the accident's preventable... if only people would listen to their advisers.
- hindsightbias 12y ago> challenger Well, as mgmt said, there was no evidence the O-rings were unsafe outside their operating limitations - because they'd never been tested at those temperatures before. I know, it's Twilight Zone material, but they found a hole in the launch rules (process) and ran with it. Previous O-ring failures had been within specs, so as far as they were concerned, it wasn't a temp issue, it was a known design flaw to be lived with. > columbia As for that article, pictures really didn't matter at that point so it wasn't "one decision." Rescue would have been a foolhardy venture more likely to kill both crews. Columbia wasn't about mgmt, it was about engineering folks being placated by decades of success and making wrong assumptions about debris. There wasn't any workable solution anyway, it was a design flaw of the launch stack. The only solution was to never fly, and engineers weren't lined up to kill their own program.