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These doors very effectively mean that control of the plane would be put into the hands of the cabin crew, but magnifies the cost of a rogue operator -- I am ce

• panarky 12y ago
  How To Lock and Unlock Airbus A320 Cockpit Door - Description and Procedures https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixEHV7c3VXs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixEHV7c3VXs
  • gadders 12y ago
    The acting in that video is first class.
    • Rooster61 12y ago
      I don't know. I think the actors could use a good... Coach. YEEEEAAAAHHHHHHHHHHH
• frevd 12y ago
  What about the much less hypothetical case that one of the pilots becomes unconscious while the other is out of the cabin. How is he supposed to get back in, ever?
  • Tomte 12y ago
    Using the override. An unconscious pilot does not override the override.
    • frevd 12y ago
      True, neither does he descend the plane.
  • ptaipale 12y ago
    There's procedure for that. Just read the comments in this thread, and watch the video.
  • Vespasian 12y ago
    These doors can be unlocked using a secret regularly changing code. After this code is entered a buzzer will inform the pilot for 30s. Then the door opens. The pilot can override the code by locking the door in which case it can only be opened from the cockpit for some minutes (5-20). Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROIH3KCEIvs&hd=1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROIH3KCEIvs&hd=1
  • post_break 12y ago
    Planes in the US have doors fitted with locks and keys.
  • ksherlock 12y ago
    §135.89 Pilot requirements: Use of oxygen. (4) If one pilot leaves a pilot duty station of an aircraft when operating at altitudes above 25,000 feet MSL, the remaining pilot at the controls shall put on and use an approved oxygen mask until the other pilot returns to the pilot duty station of the aircraft. Additionally, it's either US airline operating procedure (or perhaps FAA regulations, I couldn't find it though) for a second crew member to stay in the cockpit when one of the pilots has to leave.
• post_break 12y ago
  Planes in the US have keys that pilots take with them.
• tswartz 12y ago
  These types of scenarios are why the U.S. requires a flight attendant to enter the cockpit when a pilot exits. I wouldn't be surprised if the agencies in Europe implement the same policy by the end of the week.
  • vixen99 12y ago
    Let's hope so. Not fool-proof but this is a sound procedure isn't it? So why wasn't it implemented by European Authorities as well? I wonder what their counter-arguments were?
    • arrrg 12y ago
      I think the assumption was always that incapacitated pilots (e.g. because of a medical issue) would be the issue that would require someone to enter the locked cockpit. For those cases the procedure works as intended (the door can be opened from the outside if the person on the inside really doesn’t react). I don’t think suicidal pilots were on the forefront of anyone’s mind. In hindsight a policy of always having at least two people does seem preferable. (And, just a little reminder here: Just because someone is willing to fly a plane with 149 other people on board into a mountain doesn’t mean they would be willing to do other awful things, too, like acting violently in person against another person, for example a flight attendant. Preventing this kind of behavior may well be about putting in place many small hurdles.) I think it’s pretty clear that people in the cabin should never be able to access the cockpit against the express will of people inside the cockpit (preventing scenarios in which someone violently forces someone with knowledge of how to access the cockpit – e.g. a pilot coming back from the toilet – to divulge that information and gaining access that way), so realistically you can only throw people at this problem – and throwing people at this problem is thankfully in this case relatively straightforward and shouldn’t really have any other negative consequences. I don’t see a technical solution to this problem, but there might not have to be one.
• gadders 12y ago
  Another BBC story mentioned that some airlines (but not Lufthansa) have a policy where there has to be two people in the cockpit at all times. When the pilot/co-pilot leaves another member of the crew takes their place. Seems like a sensible idea with hindsight.
• mjburgess 12y ago
  Or to put it in a more general way: is security theatre now costing lives?
  • shillster 12y ago
    One day it may catch up to terrorism theatre!
  • mikeash 12y ago
    I strongly doubt it (for the particular case of strong cockpit doors). Historically, hijackings are more deadly than rogue pilots. Neither one is a particularly big threat, but hijackings are the more important threat of the two. How many potential attacks from the past decade and a half got stopped in the planning stage because "Well gee, Bob, that sounds great, but how are we going to get into the cockpit?" While this stuff is rare, I bet it's not zero. Beyond that, does not having a locked cockpit door actually save you from rogue pilots? I don't think so. There's a lot you can do to defeat other people when you're the only one belted in at the controls. A series of violent vertical maneuvers would suffice to defeat anyone trying to get back in. Imagine if, instead of locking the door, this guy had just pushed the nose over to negative two gees, then pulled up at positive three, repeat until everyone is dead? Or, pull the breakers for the higher-level fly-by-wire systems, point the nose at the ground, apply full throttle, and rip the wings off? The thinking seems to be that there was a calm 10 minutes or so in which he could have been stopped if only the door hadn't been in the way, but the only reason there was a calm 10 minutes was because the door was in the way.
    • walls 12y ago
      > Historically, hijackings are more deadly than rogue pilots. Is this true? I can't remember a single other plane hijacking that resulted in the deaths of passengers outside of 9/11.
      • krschultz 12y ago
        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings There were definitely a couple.
• anotheryou 12y ago
  I too wondered how many where saved by this. It certainly was debated before (here a german article from a year ago, closing with the cynical words "Than you're also dead, but at least save from terrorists. How comforting." http://www.austrianwings.info/2014/05/verriegelte-cockpittueren-notwendigkeit-oder-gar-sicherheitsrisiko/ http://www.austrianwings.info/2014/05/verriegelte-cockpittue... )
  • aurora72 12y ago
    Hey that article is exactly on topic. Here's an excerpt and my translation below: "Was geschieht, wenn sich ein Pilot zur Toilette begibt, sein Kollege im Cockpit - aus welchen Gründen auch immer - das Bewusstsein verliert oder verstirbt (solche tragischen Fälle kommen durchaus vor) und der nun außerhalb des Flightdecks befindliche Pilot plötzlich keinen Zutritt mehr zur Steuerzentrale des Flugzeuges hat? " What happens if one pilot visits the WC and his colleague in cockpit - for whatever reason - loses his consciousness (such tragic cases do happen) and yet the pilot outside of the flight deck has no more access to control center of the aircraft? It almost foresaw what was to happen on flight 4U9525.
• saalweachter 12y ago
  You also have to ask whether a lack of the door lock would have prevented the crash. Can a rogue pilot crash the plane fast enough that the door locks are irrelevant? Can he crash it while the other pilot is in the cockpit? I remember other black box recordings from another crash where one pilot was merely confused, steering the plane into a crash while the others tried to save it, and no one realized what was going on until it was too late.
  • StavrosK 12y ago
    That was the Air France flight, and it strikes me as a major UX disaster. The flight sticks' input was averaged, as if that's ever a desirable scenario! "Oh yeah, we know we want to keep it level, so you pull back on the stick a bit, I'll push it an equal amount and we'll be okay." Yeeeah.
    • richardkmichael 12y ago
      This not how simultaneous side-stick input works. Conflicting inputs are rejected with a warning ; dual input is also indicated with a warning. Non-conflicting inputs are summed, to model the way traditional centre sticks/yokes would work, when both pilots are acting. Generally, due to procedure, only one pilot is controlling the aircraft at any time; and, there is a "hand-off" to pass the control between them. There is a priority override button on each side-stick to take control from the other pilot. However, a potential problem with side-sticks arises because the sticks are independent -- the non-controlling stick does not mirror (i.e., no force feedback) the controlling stick movement, as would happen with the mechanically connected centre sticks/yokes. Meaning, the non-controlling pilot cannot tell what the controlling pilot is doing. This was the problem on AF447. If you read the CVR log, one pilot was confused about how to handle the situation and, unfortunately, he took control several times during the recovery attempt. In the final seconds, he verbally states he is pulling back on the stick (attempting to climb), which revealed to the [then returned to the cockpit] captain what he was doing, but there was not enough time to correct (forward, nose down) to exit the stall before they struck the ocean surface. (The stall warning itself was another disastrous UX problem as well, in my opinion.)
• kirsebaer 12y ago
  Rate of suicide is around 1 per 10,000 people per year. But rate of murder-suicide is much lower.
• probably_wrong 12y ago
  Bruce Schneier has said several times that reinforced doors are one of the very few improvements when it comes to airplane security[1]. I think the deeper question would be, if your pilot is compromised, can you really do anything? If the pilot of the EgyptAir Flight 990[2] could not keep his co-pilot from crashing the plane, what could a mob of random passengers realistically do? It seems to me like the DRM problem - you can't protect the pilot and keep them from hijacking the plane at the same time. At least the doors will prevent any of the other random 150 passengers from taking the plane. That does seem to me like an improvement. [1] https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/12/airline_security_a_w.html https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/12/airline_sec... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990
  • frevd 12y ago
    You can, using some biometric safeties on the controls.
    • toyg 12y ago
      How would biometrics protect from an authorized party controlling the plane he is supposed to control?
      • frevd 12y ago
        Overriding the override ;]. But yeah, it's kind of a race-condition. Not sure, how about some majority vote, enough members on the crew there to vote?
        • Piskvorrr 12y ago
          Trying to get a quorum aboard a falling plane. Now that's what I call an extreme democratic procedure ;)
          • toyg 12y ago
• sinesha 12y ago
  Do you know the rational behind having override-overrides from the cockpit? For me, this only makes sense under the assumption that Prob(malicious agent who knows emergency codes in cockpit and good agents knowing codes outside ) is much smaller Prob(good agent knowing codes in cockpit and malicious agents knowing codes outside). How is this assumption justified? Under current regulations, the latter is becoming more and more unlikely. Or this could be fixed by letting the protocol to lock the door from inside the cockpit depend on an exchange with a trusted third party like air controllers. [edit: language]
  • Tomte 12y ago
    No. The scenario is a good agent outside with a gun to his head.
    • Grue3 12y ago
      In post-9/11 world a good agent would not open the door even at the threat of his life, because were the attackers gain control of the cockpit, he would die anyway, and a lot of other people too.
  • msandford 12y ago
    I think that's the only possible counterpoint, really. But the override should be constructed so that it can only put the plane onto a "safe" autopilot route. And even then, I'm not really sure if that's actually safe without giving the plane collision avoidance, because it's entirely conceivable that in some urban airports just reverting to straight and level could cause a crash. If you're descending into an airport near NYC it's possible that you need to fly towards the city, turn and then continue descending to land. If you hit the autopilot external override at the right time you could be lower than the tallest buildings and get locked into flying into them without enough time to react. The real solution would seem to be what other people in the thread are suggesting; you must always have two people in the cockpit. At least one pilot and possibly another crew member.
    • jwalton 12y ago