4 ms·
I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's u
by pron 12y ago
I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative analysis gives their explanations any sort of definitiveness (and "proving" the inevitability of past events is exactly the same as prediction), they will fall into the same trap as economists.
A different perspective -- absolutely; a quantitative theory -- no. In fact, quantitative theory, at least in a sense similar to physics, is nearly impossible even in subjects that are much closer to physics than history. The simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple.
However, it is possible that even in a complex system, there should arise some temporary structures that can be described as linear processes, and therefore subject to some quantitative theory, but it will be short lived. Complex systems undergo phase-changes that tend to break and reform any structure. On the other hand, it can be argued that those phase changes are rare, and that human society is self-stabilizing on some global scale, so that the system -- at least for the moment -- is stable, and some quantitative analysis may apply. But I'm pretty sure no one would classify any specific society (i.e. a small subset of humankind) as stable.
- benbreen 12y agoAgreed. A big part of why I enjoy thinking about historical problems so much is that it's virtually impossible to supply a definitive explanation for anything (we're still arguing over the Roman empire's demise one and a half millennia on). I think the author's point - or at least the stance I take, which I suspect he aligns generally with too based on his work - is that quantitive data can only be used in historical arguments in what is effectively a qualitative way, i.e. as part of a larger, holistic assessment based on many perspectives rather than as a definitive "proof" of anything. But it's an exciting addition because historians typically haven't taken this approach at all prior to the last decade, excepting some forays into punchcard computing in the 60s and 70s by people like Lawrence Stone and the Annalists. Incidentally, I'd point to Pinker's "Better Angels of Our Nature" book as an example of the risks of putting too much stock in a scientific/econometric approach to history. I actually think his argument is (in broad outlines) convincing, but the way he marshals his evidence drives academic historians crazy because it ignores that history is a complex system, as you say. (i.e., he does things like saying "x tribe in New Guinea is a 'stone age' tribe and according to one or two studies has a high murder rate, therefore all humans in 'the stone age' had a murder rate comparable to that tribe.")
- tjradcliffe 12y agoPredictions can be sideways as well as forward. If one gives an explanatory account of some phenomenon, the existential claims made as part of that explanation should in general have implications for other parts of the same place and time, so by asking if those implications are plausibly supported by what we know of that place and time is a way of testing the idea that "phenomenon X is explained by Y" while still being in a position where it is impossible to make predictions about the future, or other places and times.
- pron 12y agoYes, the problem is that complex systems are complex "sideways" as well (i.e. in all dimensions). Sorry, but that's the nature of non-linear dynamics. They defy quantitative study. That's not to say that it isn't interesting or worthwhile to come up with comparative analysis to explain, say, the "European Miracle", but it can never have the same definitiveness as Newton's laws.
- scottbot 12y agoThis is true, but not entirely relevant. Life-based complex systems often share a propensity for punctuated stability specifically due to their own nature, because of the same circularity inherent in evolution (those that can survive to replicate, do). In this case, systems whose parameters tend towards stabilization persist specifically because they tend towards stabilization. The least self-undermining regularities persist (attractors). Societies formed and persisted because they were good at it, because they were a stable attractor in a larger system. We might not necessarily be able to formally describe the entire system, but our propensity towards stabilization (at the biological level, the human level, the societal level) means we can do clever things at the stability points, like develop medicines that work, design groceries which are more likely to sell certain products, and predict the outcomes of presidential elections. Now, whether or not the explanation given for the systemic outcomes are "accurate" descriptions of the underlying mechanisms is in question here, and it's an important one, but it's not a lost cause. When Copernicus set the world in orbit, there was a big argument of whether he was providing an actual explanation of the way the world works, or just a convenient mathematical shorthand for making accurate predictions. It turned out that the most parsimonious shorthand was also (ahem) less wrong than earlier mechanistic theories. So too can historians find explanations that, if not accurate representations of underlying mechanisms, can still be explanations which fit better to systemic tendencies than earlier explanations. Edit: Which is just saying that the blog author's point is still a useful one, whether or not we can ever achieve complete mechanical account of human activity.
- pron 12y agoWell, this is what historians do -- try to provide a model of a certain society at a certain time. Yet, it is important to warn of scientism (I really like that word!) When we come up with more quantitative models (as economists do) would we be able to resist the urge to believe they are scientifically predictive? And economics is a perfect example. It appears easily amenable to quantitative study, yet it does not yield very predictive models, does it (at least not nearly as predictive as we'd like)? And history is more complex than just economics. Of course we can do clever things at those stable points, but defying math isn't one of them. Predicting presidential elections is a good example. We're not really (generally) able to do that (at least, not yet). The best we do is try to get a valid statistical picture, spot a trend, and extrapolate for very short durations.
- yummyfajitas 12y agoThe simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple. This is nonsense. I think you are alluding to the fact that forward integration from an initial condition with a measurement error will have an error growing at the rate exp(liapunov_exponent x time). This doesn't mean that ODEs "defy quantitative study". One still makes quantitative predictions about them - e.g., "what is the liapunov exponent", "at what precise parameter choice does a phase change occur", "is the system recurrent, and if so what is the recurrence time", etc. Am I wrong in guessing you don't actually study nonlinear systems and are simply making guesses based on newspaper summaries and pop science?
- pron 12y agoOnce again, fajitas, your literal mind fails you. I cannot write a precise discussion of every single idea I mention, or each of my comments would be the length of a book, and they are already far longer than they should be. I mention an idea, and leave it to the mind of the reader to fill in the missing pieces. Any reader, even a critical one, can understand these are broad strokes, but not an adversarial one such as yourself. Still, in this particular case, you are right that I have not discussed simulation as a valuable tool. It may certainly be; I would find it fascinating. But does it qualify as a quantitative theory? Maybe. If you have a theory of each of the system's elements, and the simulation follows reality for some non negligible time. But would it be a model of history or a model of psychology? Would it make us understand history as a process more than we do now? In the end, if you simulate the entire universe accurately, you could predict any physical, chemical, biological, psychological and historical process. But would you understand them better? I don't think our knowledge of particle physics helps us understand human psychology, even if if some day it is able to predict it (Dostoyevsky touched on this very point 150 years ago[1]). Every level of abstraction demands its own models. I am afraid studied my studies of nonlinear systems ended back at university, many years ago. I must say, though, that I am a bit surprised at your comment. As I was writing my previous ones, I was imagining you saying that what I say here contradicts things I've said to you before about the validity of historical knowledge. I contemplated writing a few more paragraphs that explain the difference, but feared it would make the comment even less readable. Can you see it? In any event, fajitas, literal, adversarial readings tend to suffuse the discussion with a very autistic feel. I suggest that before classifying my words as "nonsense" -- though this classification does have a nice, succinct, quality -- you would try to understand what I am saying; this usually leads to a more interesting discussion. ----------- [1]: ...science itself will teach man (though to my mind it's a superfluous luxury) that he never has really had any caprice or will of his own, and that he himself is something of the nature of a piano-key or the stop of an organ, and that there are, besides, things called the laws of nature; so that everything he does is not done by his willing it, but is done of itself, by the laws of nature. Consequently we have only to discover these laws of nature, and man will no longer have to answer for his actions and life will become exceedingly easy for him. All human actions will then, of course, be tabulated according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to 108,000, and entered in an index; or, better still, there would be published certain edifying works of the nature of encyclopaedic lexicons, in which everything will be so clearly calculated and explained that there will be no more incidents or adventures in the world ... A PROPOS of nothing, in the midst of general prosperity a gentleman with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, countenance were to arise and, putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: "I say, gentleman, hadn't we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to the devil, and to enable us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!" That again would not matter, but what is annoying is that he would be sure to find followers ... Ha! ha! ha! But you know there is no such thing as choice in reality, say what you like," you will interpose with a chuckle. "Science has succeeded in so far analysing man that we know already that choice and what is called freedom of will is nothing else than-- ... And that is not all: even if man really were nothing but a piano-key, even if this were proved to him by natural science and mathematics, even then he would not become reasonable, but would purposely do something perverse out of simple ingratitude, simply to gain his point. And if he does not find means he will contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive sufferings of all sorts, only to gain his point! He will launch a curse upon the world, and as only man can curse (it is his privilege, the primary distinction between him and other animals), may be by his curse alone he will attain his object--that is, convince himself that he is a man and not a piano-key! If you say that all this, too, can be calculated and tabulated--chaos and darkness and curses, so that the mere possibility of calculating it all beforehand would stop it all, and reason would reassert itself, then man would purposely go mad in order to be rid of reason and gain his point! I believe in it, I answer for it, for the whole work of man really seems to consist in nothing but proving to himself every minute that he is a man and not a piano-key! It may be at the cost of his skin, it may be by cannibalism! And this being so, can one help being tempted to rejoice that it has not yet come off, and that desire still depends on something we don't know? -- Notes from Underground