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Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the ot
by pron 12y ago
Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the other hand, understand the limits of their knowledge, don't try to make predictions (certainly not with the same definitiveness common to many economists), and don't disguise their narratives as physical science. The author of the article under discussion, though, seems to wish history was more like physics, which it just can't be.
- cubano 12y agoI think that was Hayek's exact point...that economics cannot be like physics either, and in fact goes on to postulate that very few of the sciences can and/or should be treated as hard.
- benbreen 12y agoInteresting discussion here. I don't think you're representing the author's point correctly, though, given the larger context of the work he's doing and current debates in the historical field. Here's what he says: "I suppose the point of this post is to articulate my growing concern that we are so damn good at coming up with post-facto historical explanations to contextualize any given observation, that we are particularly susceptible to confabulating these post-facto rationalizations with the idea that we somehow knew the results of this quantitative work already." The implication here, I think, is simply that historians should be open to multiple ways of testing explanations (i.e., combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, if those are available). And in the larger context of debates about digital humanities, he's swatting down the argument that DH simply tells us what we already knew, because if done right it can be used to add a new perspective on existing arguments. The point isn't that history should be science but that "scientific"/quantitative approaches can be used to test the validity of historical claims based on more traditional historical work, like finding manuscripts in archives, doing a close reading of a key text, tracing correspondence networks, tracing the material history of a painting or object, etc. I agree with him. Edited to add: also need to be careful about confusing prediction with explanation. Historians don't predict much, but we certainly try to explain things a lot! I read this post as being exclusively about the latter.
- pron 12y agoI agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative analysis gives their explanations any sort of definitiveness (and "proving" the inevitability of past events is exactly the same as prediction), they will fall into the same trap as economists. A different perspective -- absolutely; a quantitative theory -- no. In fact, quantitative theory, at least in a sense similar to physics, is nearly impossible even in subjects that are much closer to physics than history. The simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple. However, it is possible that even in a complex system, there should arise some temporary structures that can be described as linear processes, and therefore subject to some quantitative theory, but it will be short lived. Complex systems undergo phase-changes that tend to break and reform any structure. On the other hand, it can be argued that those phase changes are rare, and that human society is self-stabilizing on some global scale, so that the system -- at least for the moment -- is stable, and some quantitative analysis may apply. But I'm pretty sure no one would classify any specific society (i.e. a small subset of humankind) as stable.
- benbreen 12y agoAgreed. A big part of why I enjoy thinking about historical problems so much is that it's virtually impossible to supply a definitive explanation for anything (we're still arguing over the Roman empire's demise one and a half millennia on). I think the author's point - or at least the stance I take, which I suspect he aligns generally with too based on his work - is that quantitive data can only be used in historical arguments in what is effectively a qualitative way, i.e. as part of a larger, holistic assessment based on many perspectives rather than as a definitive "proof" of anything. But it's an exciting addition because historians typically haven't taken this approach at all prior to the last decade, excepting some forays into punchcard computing in the 60s and 70s by people like Lawrence Stone and the Annalists. Incidentally, I'd point to Pinker's "Better Angels of Our Nature" book as an example of the risks of putting too much stock in a scientific/econometric approach to history. I actually think his argument is (in broad outlines) convincing, but the way he marshals his evidence drives academic historians crazy because it ignores that history is a complex system, as you say. (i.e., he does things like saying "x tribe in New Guinea is a 'stone age' tribe and according to one or two studies has a high murder rate, therefore all humans in 'the stone age' had a murder rate comparable to that tribe.")