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> I wonder if certificate transparency could be mandated for intermediate certificates sooner than a full DV rollout could. It should be mentioned that Certifi
by itistoday2 12y ago
> I wonder if certificate transparency could be mandated for intermediate certificates sooner than a full DV rollout could.
It should be mentioned that Certificate Transparency would not have prevented this attack (nor any other such attack).
Google has nothing to gain from CT beyond where they are right now: knowing who issued the cert.
Details: https://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparency/ https://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certific...
TLDR: https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain/blob/master/docs/Comparison.md#certificate-transparency https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain/blob/master/docs/Compa...
- yuhong 12y agoNot this particular attack, as this was a test intermediate only valid for 2 weeks, but the attack was limited to an internal corporate network. For other cases it would allow browser vendor to demand audit reports for example.
- itistoday2 12y agoSo, as mentioned in the first link, client audits via the browser would do absolutely nothing during an attack: "None of CT’s proofs (audit or consistency proofs) will detect mis-issuance of a certificate by a rogue CA, not even if gossip of STHs (signed-tree-heads) successfully occurs [1]" And that's for today's attacks. In the section before that paragraph, another attack is demonstrated that also cannot be prevented by CT's audit proofs. [1] https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000873.html https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000873....
- yuhong 12y agoAnd the point is that logging intermediates only does not directly prevent the attacks but it is still useful.