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It is possible: provided the system generates the right kind of audit information and voting receipts, and the citizen has a trusted device in which to check th

It is possible: provided the system generates the right kind of audit information and voting receipts, and the citizen has a trusted device in which to check the protocol computation. You can use signatures for verification and mix-nets or homomorphic encryption for anonymity. There are plenty of security risks in practical implementations of electronic voting, but I would not say "definitely not possible". Not saying I trust the system being discussed or that I think we should have mass online elections just yet, but this is an area under research and the results look more in the direction of "likely feasible" rather than "likely unfeasible". Which is actually quite important if we are ever going to move towards any form of democracy more direct/gradual than voting every X years for people who vote on the actual decisions. Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006#Post-election_controversy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006...

johnchristopher 12y ago
> homomorphic encryption for anonymity. You lost me there but I agree you are right concerning the possibilities of electronic voting systems and its inherent safety and accountability depending on the implementation. But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? > Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.... > On August 28, the TEPJF announced the results of the partial recount, subtracting 81,080 votes for Calderón, 76,897 votes for López Obrador, 63,114 for Roberto Madrazo, 5,962 for Patricia Mercado, 2,743 for Roberto Campa, and 7,940 for the remaining candidates. A total of 237,736 votes were annulled out of the approximately 4 million votes recounted. Than means around 6% of the recounted votes were annulled.[29][30] Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system.
- lazaroclapp 12y ago
  >> homomorphic encryption for anonymity. >You lost me there Intuitively: you can add a list of encrypted numbers and then decrypt only the result. Additionally, you can prove that the decryption is correct without revealing the private keys. Decryption keys can be distributed so that no single person can decrypt the votes directly. So, you track your encrypted and signed vote until it goes into the counting process and then you verify the zero-knowledge proofs that tell you the counting was done correctly, but the counting itself doesn't tell anyone anything about individual votes, just the sum of votes for each candidate. > But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? Right now? For national elections every X years? With our current understanding and computing infrastructure? Absolutely! I am not in favor of online voting right now (except perhaps for a limited number of remote votes for nationals outside their countries, possibly with reduced anonymity). Where secure electronic voting could shine is in direct democracy systems, where you vote on at least some important resolutions directly or where you can revoke an administration's mandate at any time by getting a threshold number of "votes of no confidence" on it. If you have to vote every week, or every month (let alone daily...), then paper voting is unworkable. > Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system. Actually, we have had electronic fraud before as well (in the global counting). So, I doubt electronic voting would fix democracy in Mexico either. At least not by itself. Just pointing out that the system being replaced is not infallible either...

johnchristopher 12y ago

> homomorphic encryption for anonymity. You lost me there but I agree you are right concerning the possibilities of electronic voting systems and its inherent safety and accountability depending on the implementation. But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? > Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.... > On August 28, the TEPJF announced the results of the partial recount, subtracting 81,080 votes for Calderón, 76,897 votes for López Obrador, 63,114 for Roberto Madrazo, 5,962 for Patricia Mercado, 2,743 for Roberto Campa, and 7,940 for the remaining candidates. A total of 237,736 votes were annulled out of the approximately 4 million votes recounted. Than means around 6% of the recounted votes were annulled.[29][30] Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system.

lazaroclapp 12y ago
>> homomorphic encryption for anonymity. >You lost me there Intuitively: you can add a list of encrypted numbers and then decrypt only the result. Additionally, you can prove that the decryption is correct without revealing the private keys. Decryption keys can be distributed so that no single person can decrypt the votes directly. So, you track your encrypted and signed vote until it goes into the counting process and then you verify the zero-knowledge proofs that tell you the counting was done correctly, but the counting itself doesn't tell anyone anything about individual votes, just the sum of votes for each candidate. > But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? Right now? For national elections every X years? With our current understanding and computing infrastructure? Absolutely! I am not in favor of online voting right now (except perhaps for a limited number of remote votes for nationals outside their countries, possibly with reduced anonymity). Where secure electronic voting could shine is in direct democracy systems, where you vote on at least some important resolutions directly or where you can revoke an administration's mandate at any time by getting a threshold number of "votes of no confidence" on it. If you have to vote every week, or every month (let alone daily...), then paper voting is unworkable. > Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system. Actually, we have had electronic fraud before as well (in the global counting). So, I doubt electronic voting would fix democracy in Mexico either. At least not by itself. Just pointing out that the system being replaced is not infallible either...