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My point, though, is that it doesn't really matter if the whole stack is open source if the binaries have been compromised, or if the browser/OS it runs on has.
by badsock 12y ago
My point, though, is that it doesn't really matter if the whole stack is open source if the binaries have been compromised, or if the browser/OS it runs on has.
There hasn't been a widely used OS without a remote exploit, in fact it's not even infrequent for the biggies. Once you control the voter's OS, the game is over. So the way I see it, if you have a few 0-day exploits (enough to get into the majority of popular OS versions), a talent for covering your tracks, and a few swing-ridings, you can decide an election.
It's just such an insane risk, and you're absolutely correct: there isn't even much to gain from moving to online voting.
- ecdavis 12y agoI was including the OS in the stack. Is there any reason why vote-casting or vote-tallying software should be running on a fully-fledged OS? It introduces a massive attack surface in exchange for a benefit that is really only felt at development time (development ease and cost). Write something custom, get it formally validated, audited, etc. and then go through a similar process to ensure the hardware is trustworthy. Of course that won't happen. The only real reason to move to electronic voting is to save money, but that's rendered moot if you have to invest a huge amount upfront just to get something trustworthy.
- badsock 12y agoRight. Given the number of countries and companies and people that are involved as you move up the chain from transistor to application, how complex even the smallest stack is, and how many opportunities there are for inserting code at every level - the effort it would take to do a full audit, and then to prove that it's uncrackable from external sources - it's not even remotely realistic. Again, I can't figure out why anyone takes the assertion that electronic voting can be secured seriously.