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> no electronic voting system, no matter how clever, is any further than one fuckup or one dirty sysadmin away from being a total fraud. Not entirely true. The

> no electronic voting system, no matter how clever, is any further than one fuckup or one dirty sysadmin away from being a total fraud. Not entirely true. The best electronic voting systems require multiple fuckups and/or multiple dirty developers and hardware manufacturers to become a total fraud. Not saying that is safe enough for elections yet, though. But there is no reason why you can't add multiple checks and balances and mutually-hostile guarantors to an electronic voting system.

femto 12y ago
The biggest problem is that the NSW Electoral Commission is holding secrets (the source code among other things). That's fundamentally at odds with a secure voting system. If the system is algorithmically secure, there should be no need to rely on the security of the NSWEC, past a set of secret keys. If the system relies on the security of the NSWEC then it is open to subversion by someone who knows the NSWEC's secrets. If the system is algorithmically secure, and the NSWEC is still not releasing information, then the NSWEC is simply undermining trust in its own system. I suspect that part of the problem is that the NSWEC is a bureaucracy, which has to justify its own existence. A secure on-line voting system, with minimal secrets, would largely make the NSWEC redundant on election day. The NSWEC need to accept that its job is to set up a secure system, then on the day relegate itself to a monitoring function on a par with any other interested citizen.
johnchristopher 12y ago
> Not entirely true. The best electronic voting systems require multiple fuckups and/or multiple dirty developers and hardware manufacturers to become a total fraud. Not saying that is safe enough for elections yet, though. But there is no reason why you can't add multiple checks and balances and mutually-hostile guarantors to an electronic voting system. But any citizens can check each of the paper voting system steps and it is definitely not possible for electronic voting system.
- lazaroclapp 12y ago
  It is possible: provided the system generates the right kind of audit information and voting receipts, and the citizen has a trusted device in which to check the protocol computation. You can use signatures for verification and mix-nets or homomorphic encryption for anonymity. There are plenty of security risks in practical implementations of electronic voting, but I would not say "definitely not possible". Not saying I trust the system being discussed or that I think we should have mass online elections just yet, but this is an area under research and the results look more in the direction of "likely feasible" rather than "likely unfeasible". Which is actually quite important if we are ever going to move towards any form of democracy more direct/gradual than voting every X years for people who vote on the actual decisions. Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006#Post-election_controversy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006...
  - johnchristopher 12y ago
    > homomorphic encryption for anonymity. You lost me there but I agree you are right concerning the possibilities of electronic voting systems and its inherent safety and accountability depending on the implementation. But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? > Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.... > On August 28, the TEPJF announced the results of the partial recount, subtracting 81,080 votes for Calderón, 76,897 votes for López Obrador, 63,114 for Roberto Madrazo, 5,962 for Patricia Mercado, 2,743 for Roberto Campa, and 7,940 for the remaining candidates. A total of 237,736 votes were annulled out of the approximately 4 million votes recounted. Than means around 6% of the recounted votes were annulled.[29][30] Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system.

femto 12y ago

The biggest problem is that the NSW Electoral Commission is holding secrets (the source code among other things). That's fundamentally at odds with a secure voting system. If the system is algorithmically secure, there should be no need to rely on the security of the NSWEC, past a set of secret keys. If the system relies on the security of the NSWEC then it is open to subversion by someone who knows the NSWEC's secrets. If the system is algorithmically secure, and the NSWEC is still not releasing information, then the NSWEC is simply undermining trust in its own system. I suspect that part of the problem is that the NSWEC is a bureaucracy, which has to justify its own existence. A secure on-line voting system, with minimal secrets, would largely make the NSWEC redundant on election day. The NSWEC need to accept that its job is to set up a secure system, then on the day relegate itself to a monitoring function on a par with any other interested citizen.

johnchristopher 12y ago

> Not entirely true. The best electronic voting systems require multiple fuckups and/or multiple dirty developers and hardware manufacturers to become a total fraud. Not saying that is safe enough for elections yet, though. But there is no reason why you can't add multiple checks and balances and mutually-hostile guarantors to an electronic voting system. But any citizens can check each of the paper voting system steps and it is definitely not possible for electronic voting system.

lazaroclapp 12y ago
It is possible: provided the system generates the right kind of audit information and voting receipts, and the citizen has a trusted device in which to check the protocol computation. You can use signatures for verification and mix-nets or homomorphic encryption for anonymity. There are plenty of security risks in practical implementations of electronic voting, but I would not say "definitely not possible". Not saying I trust the system being discussed or that I think we should have mass online elections just yet, but this is an area under research and the results look more in the direction of "likely feasible" rather than "likely unfeasible". Which is actually quite important if we are ever going to move towards any form of democracy more direct/gradual than voting every X years for people who vote on the actual decisions. Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006#Post-election_controversy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006...
- johnchristopher 12y ago
  > homomorphic encryption for anonymity. You lost me there but I agree you are right concerning the possibilities of electronic voting systems and its inherent safety and accountability depending on the implementation. But then I say paper requires less technical skills and is an order of magnitude less expensive than the cost associated with a safe and sane voting system ? > Note that the paper voting systems are also quite hackable in practice. It is actually pretty hard to track your own vote and make sure it was counted correctly, that the votes in all districts were added correctly and, when you find your vote miscounted, proving fraud is quite hard as well. I should know, I voted in this election: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006.... > On August 28, the TEPJF announced the results of the partial recount, subtracting 81,080 votes for Calderón, 76,897 votes for López Obrador, 63,114 for Roberto Madrazo, 5,962 for Patricia Mercado, 2,743 for Roberto Campa, and 7,940 for the remaining candidates. A total of 237,736 votes were annulled out of the approximately 4 million votes recounted. Than means around 6% of the recounted votes were annulled.[29][30] Wow. That is indeed a good example in favour of electronic voting system.