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> how people voted except for the testimony of a computer server Well, that's not an accurate claim. There are a number of verifiable voting protocols, e.g., H

by wsxcde 12y ago

> how people voted except for the testimony of a computer server Well, that's not an accurate claim. There are a number of verifiable voting protocols, e.g., Helios https://vote.heliosvoting.org/ https://vote.heliosvoting.org/. This doesn't mean that online voting is ready for mass adoption, but I think you're too quick to dismiss it.

lazaroclapp 12y ago
Except, even with something like Helios, it becomes, at best "the testimony of the personal computers of each voter, which are also easily hackable". In the extreme, it gives you a system where Intel can probably decide the result of every election. Edit: However, see the Estonia example at the bottom of this comment thread. I might be convinced that a combination of technology and procedural safeguards can give us an online voting system at least as "secure" as our deeply flawed but functional online banking/credit system.
badsock 12y ago
From the Helios FAQ: Should we start using Helios for public-office elections? Maybe US President 2016? No, you should not. Online elections are appropriate when one does not expect a large attempt at defrauding or coercing voters. For some elections, notably US Federal and State elections, the stakes are too high, and we recommend against capturing votes over the Internet. This has nothing to do with Helios itself: we just don’t trust that people’s home computers are secure enough to withstand significant attacks.
- wsxcde 12y ago
  It's conceivable that you can build a formally verified hardware device that handles the actual voting, and you probably also make sure that the software running on this device is all signed and authenticated with your trust rooted in hardware. And you can then secure your connection to the voting servers using this hardware device. It would be very expensive, and you still can't be sure you don't have bugs, but it would address a lot of the concerns you're raising.

by wsxcde 12y ago

lazaroclapp 12y ago

Except, even with something like Helios, it becomes, at best "the testimony of the personal computers of each voter, which are also easily hackable". In the extreme, it gives you a system where Intel can probably decide the result of every election. Edit: However, see the Estonia example at the bottom of this comment thread. I might be convinced that a combination of technology and procedural safeguards can give us an online voting system at least as "secure" as our deeply flawed but functional online banking/credit system.

badsock 12y ago

From the Helios FAQ: Should we start using Helios for public-office elections? Maybe US President 2016? No, you should not. Online elections are appropriate when one does not expect a large attempt at defrauding or coercing voters. For some elections, notably US Federal and State elections, the stakes are too high, and we recommend against capturing votes over the Internet. This has nothing to do with Helios itself: we just don’t trust that people’s home computers are secure enough to withstand significant attacks.

wsxcde 12y ago
It's conceivable that you can build a formally verified hardware device that handles the actual voting, and you probably also make sure that the software running on this device is all signed and authenticated with your trust rooted in hardware. And you can then secure your connection to the voting servers using this hardware device. It would be very expensive, and you still can't be sure you don't have bugs, but it would address a lot of the concerns you're raising.