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Security flaw in New South Wales puts thousands of online votes at risk
- jimrandomh 12y agoA web site poll is not secure enough to be an election, even if its creators do anything perfectly, and a web site poll pretending to be an election does not grant the victor legitimacy. The fundamental problem is that it leaves no evidence of how people voted except for the testimony of a computer server, which can be hacked. The practical result being that the election can be overturned by a single person inside or outside the country working with a guarantee of secrecy, and it would leave no evidence.
- thirsteh 12y agoThat wouldn't be a hard problem to solve if not for the fact that votes also need to be anonymous. That combination is what makes electronic voting an extremely difficult problem.
- wsxcde 12y ago> how people voted except for the testimony of a computer server Well, that's not an accurate claim. There are a number of verifiable voting protocols, e.g., Helios https://vote.heliosvoting.org/ https://vote.heliosvoting.org/. This doesn't mean that online voting is ready for mass adoption, but I think you're too quick to dismiss it.
- lazaroclapp 12y agoExcept, even with something like Helios, it becomes, at best "the testimony of the personal computers of each voter, which are also easily hackable". In the extreme, it gives you a system where Intel can probably decide the result of every election. Edit: However, see the Estonia example at the bottom of this comment thread. I might be convinced that a combination of technology and procedural safeguards can give us an online voting system at least as "secure" as our deeply flawed but functional online banking/credit system.
- badsock 12y agoFrom the Helios FAQ: Should we start using Helios for public-office elections? Maybe US President 2016? No, you should not. Online elections are appropriate when one does not expect a large attempt at defrauding or coercing voters. For some elections, notably US Federal and State elections, the stakes are too high, and we recommend against capturing votes over the Internet. This has nothing to do with Helios itself: we just don’t trust that people’s home computers are secure enough to withstand significant attacks.
- wsxcde 12y agoIt's conceivable that you can build a formally verified hardware device that handles the actual voting, and you probably also make sure that the software running on this device is all signed and authenticated with your trust rooted in hardware. And you can then secure your connection to the voting servers using this hardware device. It would be very expensive, and you still can't be sure you don't have bugs, but it would address a lot of the concerns you're raising.
- agwa 12y agoIt's often overlooked how including external Javascript impacts the security of your website (see also the recent Healthcare.gov information leak). It's not just the external sites' TLS configuration you have to worry about, but all their security and privacy practices. Even if piwikpro.com had had a perfect TLS configuration, if an attacker had been able to compromise (or corrupt/coerce) them, the attacker would have been able to execute arbitrary Javascript on NSW's online voting website. Stripe is the only external Javascript I load on my websites. I trust Stripe a lot more than most, but still I would prefer not to load their Javascript. This policy is frustrating because it means I can't use a lot of cool tools, but I care too much about security and the privacy of my visitors to do otherwise.
- ams6110 12y agoAn online voting site should not use javascript. Period. It should be bare-bones simplest possible HTML form posting with all validation and logic happening server-side. For one thing it needs to be accessible to disabled voters and the more complex the UI implementation, the less accessible it will be. Also for security peace of mind it should be usable with all scripting and plugins disabled. A ballot is not a complex UI. A basic HTML form with checkboxes and/or radio buttons is all that's needed.
- lazaroclapp 12y agoNot necessarily true. Ideally you want things like vote encryption and confirmation code generation to occur in the client, where they can be verified by the voters themselves. Otherwise, who is to say the election server itself is not compromised or outright designed to manipulate results. Of course, this is only useful paired with a voting protocol that allows verifying that your own vote was counted, while obscuring its association with any individual voter. See [1]. This is helpful even if only a tiny fraction of voters do verify it, say by running a browser extension that checksums the downloaded Javascript. Because of birthday paradox like results, if votes are verifiable, and a small percentage of voters properly verify their votes, then the chances that the server can modify the election results significantly (e.g. by shipping malicious javascript to some users) without being caught, are actually fairly small. [1] https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec08/tech/full_papers/adida/adida.pdf https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec08/tech/full_papers/... p.s. Of course, an issue with this system is that voters voting on a compromised computer might have their votes hijacked anyways (which is true of any remote voting protocol I know), and that verification codes aid in things like vote selling (some solutions exist, using verification code decoys and the like).
- krylon 12y agoOnline elections? Are these people serious? I am struggling to come up with the words to adequately describe what a bad idea this is.
- arkem 12y agoIt's been working ok in Estonia for a decade: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia Sure there are risks to online voting but it's significantly less risky than many of the other pieces of critical infrastructure that rely on the Internet. The risks of online voting can generally be controlled through policy and oversight, in a similar way to non-online elections.
- jacques_chester 12y agoPaper ballots work fine and, in Australia, would require the systematic subversion of hundreds of electoral officials and thousands of mutually-hostile scrutineers to rig a vote. Meanwhile, no electronic voting system, no matter how clever, is any further than one fuckup or one dirty sysadmin away from being a total fraud. Democratic legitimacy is an expensive feature, but it is worth every cent.
- lazaroclapp 12y ago> no electronic voting system, no matter how clever, is any further than one fuckup or one dirty sysadmin away from being a total fraud. Not entirely true. The best electronic voting systems require multiple fuckups and/or multiple dirty developers and hardware manufacturers to become a total fraud. Not saying that is safe enough for elections yet, though. But there is no reason why you can't add multiple checks and balances and mutually-hostile guarantors to an electronic voting system.
- femto 12y agoThe biggest problem is that the NSW Electoral Commission is holding secrets (the source code among other things). That's fundamentally at odds with a secure voting system. If the system is algorithmically secure, there should be no need to rely on the security of the NSWEC, past a set of secret keys. If the system relies on the security of the NSWEC then it is open to subversion by someone who knows the NSWEC's secrets. If the system is algorithmically secure, and the NSWEC is still not releasing information, then the NSWEC is simply undermining trust in its own system. I suspect that part of the problem is that the NSWEC is a bureaucracy, which has to justify its own existence. A secure on-line voting system, with minimal secrets, would largely make the NSWEC redundant on election day. The NSWEC need to accept that its job is to set up a secure system, then on the day relegate itself to a monitoring function on a par with any other interested citizen.
- ams6110 12y agoIMO the minimal security requirements for online voting must include fully open source code. I don't mean open source licensing, but the entire implementation must be open to public review and audit. Even with that, I have my doubts. On the other hand, traditional paper ballots are certainly prone to all kinds of fraud, and on balance I'd say an electronic system should be able to do better, if not be perfectly secure.
- boyter 12y agoAgreed. I have argued for this with other technical people and they still argue the opposite however. I am in New South Wales and have raised the source issue to all the candidates in my electorate. I usually get blank stares over this point. This worries my deeply as how can someone who does not understand the implications of what they are doing legislate laws about it. I would like to see it done better. No idea how but perhaps the taking of a test to prove some level of knowledge before being allowed to vote on any issue.
- jacques_chester 12y agoAsk the candidates if they would be happy if paper ballots were counted without scrutineers. Or with scrutineers from only one party, who have quietly replaced electoral officials.
- boyter 12y agoThats a good point. I shall be doing that the next time one is at my local train station.
- rodgerd 12y ago> and on balance I'd say an electronic system should be able to do better Based on what evidence? Paper fraud requires a physical presence, and the scope is limited to what a person or group of people can achieve. Breaching electronic systems can happen on the server or client (conversations around the latter are noticeably absent from arguments by e-voting proponents). Breaches can be orchestrated from anywhere, including locations which with no extradition agreement, and can use botnets to scale infinitely.
- badsock 12y agoIt freaks me out that people are so nonchalant about this. Browsers and OSes get cracked on a regular basis: you can't trust the server, you can't trust the client, and you can't trust the pipe in between. There is no voting algorithm in the world that can be trusted in that environment, full stop. Seriously, I'd love to hear how I'm wrong. And if not, then how could we possibly consider handing power over our laws, our courts, our armies, to whoever manages to figure out how to exploit this first? It's not like there isn't reams of evidence that people will attempt to rig votes; so if there is a way, eventually someone will succeed. Why are people OK with this?
- ecdavis 12y agoI have no idea why people are so fixated on electronic voting. Running elections with paper ballots may be costly, but relative to other costs it's very little - it's also probably the single most important service the government provides. It's not even like voting is particularly taxing in Australia. You go to your local school on a Sunday, wait in line for a while then grab a sausage or a lamington and go home. If that's too inconvenient there are pre-polling stations open for weeks ahead of time.[0] I think any software that has the potential to influence election outcomes should be provably correct (the whole stack), open source and probably have been out in the wild for years before getting used in a real election. [0] As far as I'm aware, the AEC actually double-checks electronic results by doing a human recount. When they use electronic voting it's so they can declare a winner sooner.
- badsock 12y agoMy point, though, is that it doesn't really matter if the whole stack is open source if the binaries have been compromised, or if the browser/OS it runs on has. There hasn't been a widely used OS without a remote exploit, in fact it's not even infrequent for the biggies. Once you control the voter's OS, the game is over. So the way I see it, if you have a few 0-day exploits (enough to get into the majority of popular OS versions), a talent for covering your tracks, and a few swing-ridings, you can decide an election. It's just such an insane risk, and you're absolutely correct: there isn't even much to gain from moving to online voting.
- thret 12y agoThere is one way to make online voting secure that hasn't been discussed here: make the votes public. Publish a full list of who voted online and who they voted for. You could then vote online publicly or in person privately. It isn't ideal, but it would remove any doubt.
- harywilke 12y agoI see you voted for candidate 'B', you're fired.