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Ubuntu, Redhat, and other distros are compatible with secure boot. I understand the concern, but the flip side is that if secure boot makes my future Ubuntu la
by mark_l_watson 12y ago
Ubuntu, Redhat, and other distros are compatible with secure boot.
I understand the concern, but the flip side is that if secure boot makes my future Ubuntu laptops more secure that could be a good thing.
Linux is here to stay. Relax.
- DougHaber 12y agoWhat if I prefer Debian over Ubuntu? Can I be upset then? I'm sure this will be possible to hack around, but we shouldn't have to hack our own computers to use them. A simple option to disable secure boot would solve all the problems. The vendors know this, so I'm curious why they would chose to not provide the option. Is there some belief that by even having the option, the system would be inherently more insecure? I'm sure that some vendors will provide an option, so this will just likely be an extra thing to research before buying a new system.
- mark_l_watson 12y agoDoug, if you use a Linux distro that is not signed, then yes, it is an issue because you will have to track down laptops that allow allow disabling secure boot. BTW, I didn't intend to sound flippant in my original comment, it is just that as I get older (I turn 2^8 next month, yeah :-) I am more concerned with convenience, fun and productive development environments, etc.
- Twirrim 12y agoSo what if Microsoft decide to no longer allow Ubuntu or Redhat to get signed keys?
- gnoway 12y agoI would be more worried about other OS projects that are either too disorganized to meet whatever the signing qualifications are, or have ideological issues which prevent them from participating.
- pgeorgi 12y agoCanonical doesn't enforce signature checks for module loading (which is useful for DKMS based kernel modules, and is also a "freedom to tinker" matter). That may well lead to a revoked Secure Boot key at some point...
- vezzy-fnord 12y agoThankfully, that's just about any x86 laptop at present.
- polar 12y ago> I turn 2^8 next month 256‽
- mark_l_watson 12y agoGood catch. I meant 2^6
- pdkl95 12y agoI don't use Ubuntu and Redhat. Once they decided to follow a windows model with systemd and the "break everything on purpose" style of writing software, they were no longer useful. So what about the massive variety of other distributions that didn't - or cannot in the case of Free Software - sign up for the restrictions inherent in being "compatible with secure boot"? More importantly, why limit this to linux? It would be a lot harder to develop a new OS - just like Linus did - when you have to deal with secure boot.
- byuu 12y agoSerious question: how does Secure Boot make you more secure? How many times has a virus latched onto your computer by executing before your system booted up? I've never heard of this happening to anyone I've ever known. The only scenario I can imagine is having a PC set to auto-boot from peripherals, and a USB key having something bad execute before invoking your hard disk's boot loader. And that is obviously possible, but terrifying more complex to pull off. But that seems a lot more like a local, physical attack that's much less useful and more targeted than your ordinary viruses that install after executing inside your OS, where viruses seem to have no problems pulling off privilege escalation exploits to gain kernel access then. Plus you can easily block this and then lock down your BIOS already. It really seems like Secure Boot is solving a problem almost no one ever had. I may well be misunderstanding the point, so please elaborate on how this is useful and absolutely prevents a class of attack that could not be done otherwise.
- ntakasaki 12y agohttp://www.chmag.in/article/sep2011/rootkits-are-back-boot-infection http://www.chmag.in/article/sep2011/rootkits-are-back-boot-i... http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/16/tdl_rootkit_does_64_bit_windows/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/16/tdl_rootkit_does_64_... http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217953/Rootkit_infection_requires_Windows_reinstall_says_Microsoft http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217953/Rootkit_infec... A snippet: TDL4 is the most recent high tech and widely spread member of the TDSS family rootkit, targeting x64 operating systems too such as Windows Vista and Windows 7. One of the most striking features of TDL4 is that it is able to load its kernel-mode driver on systems with an enforced kernel-mode code signing policy (64-bit versions of Microsoft Windows Vista and 7) and perform kernel-mode hooks with kernel-mode patch protection policy enabled. When the driver is loaded into kernel-mode address space it overwrites the MBR (Master Boot Record) of the disk by sending SRB (SCSI Request Block) packets directly to the miniport device object, then it initializes its hidden file system. The bootkit’s modules are written into the hidden file system from the dropper. The TDL4 bootkit controls two areas of the hard drive one is the MBR and other is the hidden file system created at the time of malware deployment. When any application reads the MBR, the bootkit changes data and returns the contents of the clean MBR i.e. prior to the infection, and also it takes care of Infected MBR by protecting it from overwriting. The hidden file system with the malicious components also gets protected by the bootkit. So if any application is making an attempt to read sectors of the hard disk where the hidden file system is stored, It will return zeroed buffer instead of the original data. The bootkit contains code that performs additional checks to prevent the malware from the cleanup. At every start of the system TDL4 bootkit driver gets loaded and initialized properly by performing tasks as follows: Reads the contents of the boot sector, compares it with the infected image stored in hidden file system, if it finds any difference between these two images it rewrites the infected image to the boot sector. Sets the DriverObject field of the miniport device object to point to the bootkit’s driver object and also hooks the DriverStartIo field of the miniport’s driver object. If kernel debugging is enabled then this TDL4 does not install any of it’s components. TDL4 Rootkit hooks the ATAPI driver i.e. standard windows miniport drivers like atapi.sys. It keeps Device Object at lowest in the device stack, which makes a lot harder to dump TDL4 files. All these striking features have made TDL4 most notorious Windows rootkit and it is also very important to mention that the key to its success is the boot sector infection. Another bit: The original MBR and driver component are stored in encrypted form using the same encryption. Driver component hooks ATAPI's DriverStartIo routine where it monitors for write operations. In case of write operation targeted at the MBR sector, it is changed to read operation. This way it is trying to bypass repair operation by Security Products
- jeff_marshall 12y agoThis is true today, but it ignores the realities of many secure boot implementations. Specifically, many UEFI firmware vendors don't include the ability for the hardware owner to update the public key used to verify a bootloader signature. This means that someone wanting to use a new bootloader on one of these platforms has to beg for permission from whoever owns the existing keys (Microsoft seems to be popular right now...) to get their software to boot. Right now, MS is willing to sign bootloaders for OSS, but this could change at any time. Do you really want MS to control the ability to boot your operating system of choice?
- mark_l_watson 12y agoJeff, you mention valid concerns but there are two things that make me feel reasonably comfortable with this: there will be laptop manufacturers who will provide selective disabling because of market pressures, and, I think the 'new Microsoft' sees its future as providing productivity tools cross platform. I find the web based versions of Office 365 to be handy to have on my Linux laptops and I would be a little surprised if Microsoft does not eventually offer native apps for Linux. Although I am a fan, for my own projects, of GPL and AGPL licenses, I do like the availability of commercial apps on Linux. I like Linux because it is a great development platform but I am less of a purist than I used to be concerning an occasional commercial app.
- jeff_marshall 12y agoIt's less about Linux for me than about the other things I want to boot (MS is unlikely to disable Linux bootloaders on certified Windows PCs for lots of reasons). By way of example, the company where I work today produces a hypervisor for x86. We're nowhere near big enough to exert market pressure on someone the size of MS or the hardware manufacturers. When we recently added UEFI support to our product, we looked at support for UEFI secure boot as well. Some systems made key management easy (obvious bios options, etc.), but others made it impossible. Upon investigation, this mostly appears to be more due to apathy on the hardware vendors part than any conspiracy theory, but for an end user the distinction is unimportant. Today we can work-around this by using an MS-signed bootloader shim, but this reduces the security of the end solution (any ms-signed shim will boot, a third party owns the root keys). And, as I mentioned in my comment above, MS can change their policies at any time. I haven't run into an x86 system yet that doesn't at least allow you to disable secure boot, but the trend towards more locked-down hardware in general (esp. in mobile) worries me due to the potential for anti-competitive behavior towards both commercial and open-source software from third parties.
- Perseids 12y agoRemember that `SecureBoot`ed Kernels only load signed kernel modules, because otherwise you could still run arbitrary kernel code. Thus with locked secured boot you cannot ever use self-compiled kernel modules, e.g. Nvidia driver and ZFS.