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What do you say to the argument in http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/: >But let me ask you this. Supp
by ikeboy 12y ago
What do you say to the argument in http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/:
>But let me ask you this. Suppose you had to choose between one person being tortured for 50 years, and a googol people being tortured for 49 years, 364 days, 23 hours, 59 minutes and 59 seconds. You would choose one person being tortured for 50 years, I do presume; otherwise I give up on you.
>And similarly, if you had to choose between a googol people tortured for 49.9999999 years, and a googol-squared people being tortured for 49.9999998 years, you would pick the former.
>A googolplex is ten to the googolth power. That's a googol/100 factors of a googol. So we can keep doing this, gradually - very gradually - diminishing the degree of discomfort, and multiplying by a factor of a googol each time, until we choose between a googolplex people getting a dust speck in their eye, and a googolplex/googol people getting two dust specks in their eye.
>If you find your preferences are circular here, that makes rather a mockery of moral grandstanding. If you drive from San Jose to San Francisco to Oakland to San Jose, over and over again, you may have fun driving, but you aren't going anywhere. Maybe you think it a great display of virtue to choose for a googolplex people to get dust specks rather than one person being tortured. But if you would also trade a googolplex people getting one dust speck for a googolplex/googol people getting two dust specks et cetera, you sure aren't helping anyone. Circular preferences may work for feeling noble, but not for feeding the hungry or healing the sick.
- pyrois 12y agoHe's assuming linearity, which at the very least needs justification. He's assuming that the function that maps from the pair (number of people, type of torture) to suffering is linear in the number of people, and also linear in the type of torture. I don't believe either of those things are true. To put it more clearly, he says: > So we can keep doing this, gradually - very gradually - diminishing the degree of discomfort And I don't agree that you can. The difference between dust-mote and torture is not one of degree, but one of _kind_. It's a discontinuous function (in my opinion). I don't know where the discontinuity is, but it's there.
- ikeboy 12y ago>It's a discontinuous function (in my opinion). There are a finite number of possible brain states, far less than the 3||3 number. All possible "feelings" is likewise less than that. You need to be dividing all possible feelings of pain into two groups, and asserting that the absolute worst of the first group (containing dust specks) is incommensurate with the absolute best of the second group (containing torture). At some point you need to say that you'd pick specks even over 1 minute of torture, even over 1 second, on which I think most people's intuitions would stop saying that. Or you need to find some point between 50 years and 1 second where it become commensurate.
- pyrois 12y agoSure, they are commensurate at some point. I'd pick one nanosecond of torture over the dust-motes, for instance. But I'm not certain that I would ever choose the 50 years of torture over the dust motes for any number of dust-moted people. That's because it's not continuous, so you can't do the sort of epsilon-delta proofs that Yudkowsky's argument depends on. At least, in my opinion.
- ikeboy 12y agoThat means that for some amount of time, say X seconds, you would prefer X-1 seconds of torture for one person over specks, but prefer specks over X seconds of torture for one person. But let's double each side; presumably you would make the same decision if asked again, right? So now you prefer X-1 seconds of torture done to each of two people, over twice as much specks. Now, unless X is very low, you should prefer X for a single person over X-1 for two people. (If you disagree with this, please give a plausible value for X that makes it false.) So you prefer X on a single person over double!specks, but prefer single!specks over X. This seems extremely unlikely. Or even if true, we should be able to make you pick torture for 50 years just by multiplying specks another couple of orders of magnitude. Does this make his argument any clearer?
- kybernetikos 12y agoWe're social animals. There's an amount of discomfort (maybe not large) I would be prepared to undergo to help someone else, and I find myself thinking that others "should" also be prepared to undergo such an amount of discomfort to assist others. Given the choice to accept a dust mote temporarily in my eye as part of a huge crowd in order to save another person from torture, I would gladly accept that, and I think all reasonable people would too, therefore there is no number of people such that I believe the utility of dustmote vs torture turns out in favour of torture.
- TheOtherHobbes 12y agoActually my decision probably depends on the person. [cough] But anyway. This isn't even philosophy - it's a digital remix of medieval scholasticism pretending to be philosophy. The irony is that politics proves empirically that ideas actually can be dangerous and harmful. And some ideas - actually narratives - can be very dangerous and harmful indeed. There's over a century of "persuasion technology" (Bernays, etc) that exploits this. Nothing I've seen Y write deals with the problem of politics as a social exploit in an insightful - never mind a useful - way. Meanwhile real people are being tortured in real ways. What's his proposed rational solution to that problem?
- Neslit 12y agoI notice you didn't actually say at which point you would prefer torturing (10^100)*X people for Y years each, over torturing X people for Y+0.0000001 years each, for X and Y at least 0.0000001. (You may assume you don't know anything in particular about these people, other than that they are adult humans.)
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- TheOtherHobbes 12y agoOf course I didn't. When dealing with real moral issues the question is wholly trivial. The fact that it includes some numbers that reduce to some other numbers doesn't change that. Putting numbers into something doesn't make it scientific or objective. It just makes it numerical. There is a difference, and it's not a small one.
- Neslit 12y agoWhat the heck? Sorry, I didn't understand any of this. Are you saying that with real moral issues, it always trivially wrong to torture? This seems simply false. If I capture person X and X's laptop Y, and X tells me under no duress that Y contains the location of a nuclear bomb that X has placed in a major city, and I have other strong evidence that this is true, but X refuses to give me the password to Y; then it is moral (but rightly illegal) for me to torture X for the password to Y. Torture is not literally incommensurate with any other bad thing. Then the question arises, how do we, in full generality, determine which is the greater of two evils (or the better of two goods)? The torture vs. dust specks thing is supposed to disabuse people of the unhelpful notion that some things are somehow incomparable in terms of goodness and badness.