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That's exactly the point - she has all physical information. If you could show that some piece of information fits the definition of "physical information", the

That's exactly the point - she has all physical information. If you could show that some piece of information fits the definition of "physical information", then it's assumed that Mary has it, and someone defending the knowledge argument would have to agree. The point is that even IF you give Mary all that information, she's still missing some information. Then, that information must not be physical information. More to the point, there's a difference between the points you presented: In (A), you say Mary has all _physical_ knowledge (Jackson uses the word information, but the difference is unimportant). In (B), you note that she gets new _knowledge_. It follows that this knowledge must be non-physical, since we assumed that she had all physical knowledge, and yet, she didn't have this new knowledge.

thaumaturgy 12y ago
But this looks identical to the "immovable object vs. unstoppable object" paradox. It presupposes something that doesn't actually exist. Experience is information. It doesn't make sense to imagine a situation in which she has all the information about a thing, except experience. Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't.
- jordonwii 12y ago
  Let's take the claim "experience is information" to be true (I've yet to find a reasonable definition of "information", so I agree). Jackson's point here is specifically to show that there are at least two kinds of information: physical information, and information that is not physical. Bearing that in mind, what do you mean by: > "Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't."
  - thaumaturgy 12y ago
    What I mean is that all information is physical information -- I'm rejecting outright his starting premise, because no amount of research on wavelengths or poetry will excite the exact same neurons in your brain that are excited by actually seeing a color. I suppose that my objection falls under 4.2 in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/, specifically, metaphysical physicalism: "there are no non-physical individuals, properties or relations and no non-physical facts". What would be a good example of non-physical information?
fenomas 12y ago
That's not what I'm asking about. This thought experiment is meant to argue that not all knowledge is physical, right? Set aside any notion of what those terms mean and consider it in the abstract. It sets out to argue that "Not all X has property Y", and then asks us to consider a hypothetical situation with the premises "Assume that Mary has all X with Y" and "Assume that later she finds more X". The thought experiment doesn't support the claim that not all knowledge is physical, it requires it - i.e. the definition of begging the question. Perhaps the point here is that "Mary gains new knowledge" is supposed to be so manifestly obvious that it doesn't need to be argued? If so, this seems far from obvious to me.

thaumaturgy 12y ago

But this looks identical to the "immovable object vs. unstoppable object" paradox. It presupposes something that doesn't actually exist. Experience is information. It doesn't make sense to imagine a situation in which she has all the information about a thing, except experience. Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't.

jordonwii 12y ago
Let's take the claim "experience is information" to be true (I've yet to find a reasonable definition of "information", so I agree). Jackson's point here is specifically to show that there are at least two kinds of information: physical information, and information that is not physical. Bearing that in mind, what do you mean by: > "Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't."
- thaumaturgy 12y ago
  What I mean is that all information is physical information -- I'm rejecting outright his starting premise, because no amount of research on wavelengths or poetry will excite the exact same neurons in your brain that are excited by actually seeing a color. I suppose that my objection falls under 4.2 in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/, specifically, metaphysical physicalism: "there are no non-physical individuals, properties or relations and no non-physical facts". What would be a good example of non-physical information?

fenomas 12y ago

That's not what I'm asking about. This thought experiment is meant to argue that not all knowledge is physical, right? Set aside any notion of what those terms mean and consider it in the abstract. It sets out to argue that "Not all X has property Y", and then asks us to consider a hypothetical situation with the premises "Assume that Mary has all X with Y" and "Assume that later she finds more X". The thought experiment doesn't support the claim that not all knowledge is physical, it requires it - i.e. the definition of begging the question. Perhaps the point here is that "Mary gains new knowledge" is supposed to be so manifestly obvious that it doesn't need to be argued? If so, this seems far from obvious to me.