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the solution here is to release the schematics, and the resaulting gate-level netlists. People who want to verify designs can use scan/jtag to verify that desig
by Taniwha 12y ago
the solution here is to release the schematics, and the resaulting gate-level netlists. People who want to verify designs can use scan/jtag to verify that designs do waht they claim
- sliverstorm 12y agoIf the design is suspect, so is the scan chain.
- lifeisstillgood 12y agoI understood that jtag was effectively trusting what the circuit reports back - a bit like asking a binary to tell you it's own md5. I am interested to know if I am wrong (it's not uncommon) and if scan chains might solve that too. A different approach might be to fingerprint different areas of the chip under different inputs - so for example when this bus passes over a million zero words, everything connected to it performs in a unique way that would not work if the chip was physically different to it's schematic?
- xai3luGi 12y agoYou may have missed this article about putting backdoors into computer chips by changing the amount of doping of the silicon: http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Ars summary: http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/researchers-can-slip-an-undetectable-trojan-into-intels-ivy-bridge-cpus/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/researchers-can-slip...