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There are middle grounds that would still be better than a plaintext internet. Cert pinning, even self-signed certs, would be better. First time to https://exa
by unethical_ban 12y ago
There are middle grounds that would still be better than a plaintext internet. Cert pinning, even self-signed certs, would be better.
First time to https://example.com https://example.com - I get a prompt and a UI element telling me it's self signed. I accept the risk (This may not be who you think it is! - but it probably is)
2 - nth time to https://example.com https://example.com - UI element tells me it's self signed, but the same as before. Whether it's the NSA or the site, it's the same person at the other end.
Next - does the cert change to a PKI-trusted? Then great! I get a UI element (no prompt) showing the site is trusted. Does the site get a new self-signed cert? Back to the first step.
I believe this, and the parent notion of default cert generation by apache installs, is better than no SSL. It's not as good as fully verifiable auth.
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And son of a gun, I know this isn't an original idea, but I can't believe it took another post to remind me this is exactly how SSH works. Sure, you can get the server key to your DO host and transfer it to your client, but how many people do that? They accept the fingerprint they see at first, assume it's good, and probably raise an eyebrow if it changes. Don't like it? OK, let's go back to telnet.
- MichaelGG 12y agoIf state level actors wanted to MITM all SSH connections to make you accept the wrong key, they could. But it has a high chance of being caught as generally, you'll pay attention when the key changes. Plus you can reasonably verify the key out of band. (And one could imagine an extension to add a bit of CA-style key verification, like, "was this key generated by my account or my VPS provider, allowing you to manually verify one key and then being set for the rest.) Whereas if you do this on HTTP, a: you're constantly having a lot more "first time" connections. B: you've got no real way to know when the key changed legitimately. Users would quickly grow accustomed to key change warnings and ignore them. Or you'd see banners on sites like "ignore the key warning; I reinstalled my blog and the key changed". Attacks could even inject such a banner. If you want to manually verify every cert, you can already do that today: just go and add certs to your browser! Unauthed HTTPS-by-default just adds complexity and a false sense of security and isn't worth pushing out on the public.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- fleitz 12y agoI think the problem is that HTTPS carries the connotation of security, renaming this proposal would make it obvious to users what the expectations are. Lets change the name of it to something like httpe e for encrypted, s for secure. Let's change the behavior of httpe to automatically accept the first key it sees for a domain. Browsers have the option of uploading the lists of domains and keys to their creator, Firefox, Google, etc which can then be collated and updated from the browser. This data could be used to spot where MITM attacks are taking place.
- thanksgiving 12y agoThis is the first time I've heard of HTTPe and I love it! However, I'd like to sit on it for a bit. Let's encrypt should come out later this year. I want to give it a chance. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/certificate-authority-encrypt-entire-web https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/certificate-authority-...