3 ms·
Ted's original point about Heartbleed not being a violation of memory safety is bogus, because there is a configuration of OpenSSL (achievable with flags passed
by munin 12y ago
Ted's original point about Heartbleed not being a violation of memory safety is bogus, because there is a configuration of OpenSSL (achievable with flags passed to ./config) where extended-sized Payload values cause the OpenSSL server to segfault with an out of bounds read. It takes a special kind of bravery to look at that kind of crash and say that it is not the result of a violation of memory safety.
- tedunangst 12y agoI'll be the last person to claim there aren't memory safety violations in OpenSSL.
- munin 12y agoYes, but you specifically said that Heartbleed wasn't a memory safety violation, when in fact OpenSSL-vulnerable-to-Heartbleed can segfault on over-read. So what is it?
- MichaelGG 12y agoBut Heartbleed still existed even without out-of-bound reads, right? That's the critical distinction I got wrong and why Ted made his rather fine point. In Ted post, IIRC, he's clear that Rust will unlikely have such needed up code written. But that if people like me boast how Rust would have flat-out refused to compile such code, then we don't know the details and probably aren't in a position to be spouting off on security. A one or two word edit of my original comment would have avoided this whole discussion while retaining the essence that Rust would, in practice, almost certainly eliminate these bugs.
- tedunangst 12y agoI did?