3 ms·
That's a very good explanation of the general state of affairs. But in my experience trying the Certificate Patrol add-on for Firefox for a few months, the ide
by PhantomGremlin 12y ago
That's a very good explanation of the general state of affairs.
But in my experience trying the Certificate Patrol add-on for Firefox for a few months, the ideal of "the authentic site's fingerprint" doesn't exist for big sites. It works for small sites like grc.com, but larger sites constantly present a variety of certificates. That variety seems to change every few days. Also certificate expiration times frequently change. Gibson does acknowledge "False-Positive Mismatches" but in my experience this is a big big problem that makes the single "fingerprint" idea almost useless.
A smart add-on would eliminate a lot of these false positives. E.g. if your browser has already stored a certificate for a site and the new certificate is issued by the same CA to the same entity and the only difference is a new expiration date, why not silently accept the new one, while still remembering the old expiration? That's a risk I'd be willing to take.
Same thing for multiple certificates from different issuers. I want to be warned only the first time a certificate is encountered. If the same one is encountered again next week or next month, then that's another "false-positive mismatch" that should be silently suppressed.
And, realistically, why does there need to be an add-on? Mozilla gets something like $300 million per year in funding. What are they doing with all that money, if Firefox is still so vulnerable to this nonsense?
- toomuchtodo 12y agoI think it would also be valuable if sites would also publish their SSL certificate fingerprints out of band, perhaps through DNS TXT records, for verification.
- IgorPartola 12y agoOr via HTTP. Why bother with DNS? Just put them at /certs.txt and serve them over HTTP. It would be equally as secure as serving them over DNS, that is not at all.
- toomuchtodo 12y agoHTTP is insecure and could be MITM. And HTTPS is no good as you don't know if you can trust the cert, as you couldn't get the fingerprints before connecting. DNSSEC is secure.
- IgorPartola 12y agoYet, DNSSEC introduces a huge number of other problems like giving government agents even more control over the Internet. I was strongly in the DNSSEC camp until doing more research into it. I'd summon @tptacek for this discussion, but I think you've actually participated in a few of those already with him.