4 ms·
Looks pretty good. Their configuration could use a larger DHE parameters (2048), replace RC4 with 3DES and enable OCSP Stapling. But it's already in the top 1%
by jvehent 12y ago
Looks pretty good. Their configuration could use a larger DHE parameters (2048), replace RC4 with 3DES and enable OCSP Stapling. But it's already in the top 1% for TLS quality!
$ ./cipherscan pinterest.com
................
Target: pinterest.com:443
prio ciphersuite protocols pfs_keysize
1 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
3 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
4 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 DH,1024bits
5 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
6 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
7 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
8 AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2
9 AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2
10 AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
11 AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2
12 AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2
13 AES256-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
14 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
15 RC4-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
Certificate: trusted, 2048 bit, sha256WithRSAEncryption signature
TLS ticket lifetime hint: 300
OCSP stapling: not supported
Server side cipher ordering
- casca 12y agoThe use of RC4 is odd as it's fairly broken[1]. Misconfiguration? [1] http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-we...
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoMisconfiguration. All RC4 ciphersuites are explicitly forbidden by RFC, and considered a severe vuln by CVE. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465
- jvehent 12y ago75% of alexa's top 1 million have RC4 enabled [1]. It will take a lot of evangelizing to finally get rid of it. [1] https://securitypitfalls.wordpress.com/2015/03/13/february-2015-scan-results/ https://securitypitfalls.wordpress.com/2015/03/13/february-2...
- AlyssaRowan 12y ago…how about a new twist on an old partial plaintext recovery attack that can actually steal passwords in the wild, given a cute name and a logo, being demonstrated in 11 days at Black Hat Asia 2015? I think that might help speed things along a bit. https://www.blackhat.com/asia-15/briefings.html#bar-mitzva-attack-breaking-ssl-with-13-year-old-rc4-weakness https://www.blackhat.com/asia-15/briefings.html#bar-mitzva-a... If you're managing a system, do what the RFC said: turn off RC4 on all the servers and clients. You were warned!
- mike_hearn 12y agoI wonder if this is/was the amazing crypto breakthrough known as BULLRUN, or at least very similar. It seems likely that if academic researchers are now able to extract partial plaintexts from RC4 with nothing more than passive eavesdropping, it's possible that GCHQ/NSA has gone all the way.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoIt's kind of confusing. BULLRUN/EDGEHILL projects are umbrella cover terms: Secure Communities of Interest regarding general access to NSA/GCHQ (respectively) efforts to defeat network communication technologies such as TLS and IPsec, not particular individual cryptanalytic attacks, vulnerabilities, backdoors or techniques. I think you want the PICARESQUE ECI compartment, specifically (TS//SI-PIQ). NSA are said to have had a "cryptanalytic breakthrough" which "surprised" GCHQ some years ago. Specific operational details are currently undisclosed, but there have been references to PIQ (PICARESQUE) blades at locations of some TEMPORA full-take feeds processing the (72-hour) network intercept ring buffers in nearline and providing passive decrypts on-site to the backend via crypt attacks. They have only one-way access, and aren't active/QUANTUM (MoTS/MiTM) attacks, or PAWLEYS (key-stealing) attacks. The prevalence of RC4 within TLS (and other protocols) at the time, that it apparently directly provides plaintext decrypts, and RC4's relative weakness, suggest it as the most likely candidate for attack. So, no, don't use RC4! …not that I've had the opportunity to reverse any of these blades recently, you understand…