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While I agree DNSSEC has its limitations and problems, I haven't heard many alternatives (in general). DNS has two inherent issues: - Hijacking traffic via sp
by Someone1234 12y ago
While I agree DNSSEC has its limitations and problems, I haven't heard many alternatives (in general).
DNS has two inherent issues:
- Hijacking traffic via spoofing responses.
- Private information leakage.
With DNSSEC combined with HTTPS it is very reasonable to say that both you're connecting to the party you're expecting to connect to and in addition, no third party listening on the line either knows what host name or page you're visiting (only the IP address of the box).
A lot of people dismiss these limitations or just point wildly at certificate pinning to solve all of our problems (while ignoring that HTTP isn't the only type of traffic the internet was designed for).
Plus with NSA mass surveillance, DNS makes seeing what domains you're visiting and building a "picture" of you as an individual absolutely trivial. The IP addresses still may help them do that to some extent, but it certainly becomes very easy if they can see your DNS packets.
- icebraining 12y agoWith DNSSEC combined with HTTPS it is very reasonable to say that both you're connecting to the party you're expecting to connect to and in addition, no third party listening on the line either knows what host name or page you're visiting (only the IP address of the box). No, because clients don't validate DNSSEC responses. You'd need to be running a full resolver in your machine, which OSs usually don't. Also, with SNI¹ they'll know the hostname anyway. ¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
- danyork 12y ago> Plus with NSA mass surveillance, DNS makes seeing what domains you're visiting and building a "picture" of you as an individual absolutely trivial. The IP addresses still may help them do that to some extent, but it certainly becomes very easy if they can see your DNS packets. FYI, there is a working group within the IETF working on the issue of providing confidentiality to DNS transactions. It's called DPRIVE and more info can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/
- IvyMike 12y ago> I haven't heard many alternatives (in general). From tptacek's FAQ ( http://sockpuppet.org/stuff/dnssec-qa.html http://sockpuppet.org/stuff/dnssec-qa.html ): > What’s the alternative to DNSSEC? > Do nothing. The DNS does not urgently need to be secured. > All effective security on the Internet assumes that DNS lookups are unsafe. If this bothers people from a design perspective, they should consider all the other protocol interactions in TCP/IP that aren’t secure: BGP4 advertisements, IP source addresses, ARP lookups. Clearly there is some point in the TCP/IP stack where we must draw a line and say “security and privacy are built above this layer”. The argument against DNSSEC simply says the line should be drawn somewhere higher than the DNS.
- danyork 12y agoRight.... which is where I disagree with Thomas. I believe we should secure the integrity of answers from DNS. I want a DNS we can trust. I see DNSSEC as one of the many layers in any defense-in-depth security plan. Yes, I acknowledge that there are some challenges with DNSSEC deployment... but those are what a good number of us are working on fixing. I don't see "Do nothing" as a viable alternative.
- tptacek 12y agoDoing nothing is self-evidently viable. Virtually no business transactions in the world are protected by DNSSEC today. None ever have been. The onus is on you to demonstrate that DNSSEC is viable, because "no DNS security at all" clearly does work. You keep walking face-first into this rhetorical brick wall. If you're going to say "doing nothing isn't viable", you need to have a ready response to the extremely obvious observation that the Internet seems to function pretty OK without DNS security. It's not 1994 anymore. You can't wave your hands and suggest that the Internet is going to get more serious in 10 years and need better security. It already needs the best security it can possibly get. It's just that DNSSEC isn't part of that mix.
- yuhong 12y agoI think it is unfortunate that you leave DNSCurve at the end. I think securing the DNS is a good thing regardless.
- secalex 12y ago> I haven't heard many alternatives (in general). These problems don't call for a general solution. We should respect the fundamental truth behind the end-to-end principle and solve these problems as close to the application as possible. The likely threats, appropriate default choices and trust model are all best understood by each application developer and building these solutions into Layer-3/4 is bound to cause short-term pain and reduce our long-term flexibility to meet new risks. For example, EFF's STARTTLS Everywhere project takes into account the fact that a huge percentage of the world's mail moves between a small enough number of providers that human verification of announcements is possible. It also recognizes that the MX configuration for these providers is reasonably static, meaning that changes that propagate in minutes do not need to be accommodated. Small specific solutions like this can be rolled out and provide a real, tangible benefit to users much faster than we can upgrade the entire DNS system to provide a more general solution. I agree that we need a DNS privacy solution, one that hopefully doesn't eliminate the existence of caching infrastructure.
- danyork 12y ago> I agree that we need a DNS privacy solution, one that hopefully doesn't eliminate the existence of caching infrastructure. Please do take a look at what the folks are doing within the DPRIVE working group of the IETF: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/ They are working on mechanisms to bring privacy / confidentiality to the "last mile" of DNS connections. Any input you have would be useful. (There's a link there to a mailing list to which you can subscribe.)
- davidu 12y agoDNSSEC does nothing to prevent information leakage, the opposite in fact. People compare it to SSL but it's not like SSL. It does NO encryption of the commuications. It's only validation (argubaly the most broken part of SSL). A better ananlog to SSL would be DNSCrypt, which we've been using now for years, is slowly gaining traction and adoption by others, and provides real privacy from DNS messages from being intercepted or manipulated.