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Surprised that the mitigations section did not mention ECC RAM. Wouldn't it be effective mitigation?
by zokier 12y ago
Surprised that the mitigations section did not mention ECC RAM. Wouldn't it be effective mitigation?
- stefantalpalaru 12y ago"We also tested some desktop machines, but did not see any bit flips on those. That could be because they were all relatively high-end machines with ECC memory. The ECC could be hiding bit flips."
- lelf 12y agoNot necessary, see the original paper. For example, SECDED (single error-correction, double error- detection) can correct only a single-bit error within a 64-bit word. If a word contains two victims, however, SECDED cannot correct the resulting double-bit error. And for three or more victims, SECDED cannot even detect the multi-bit er- ror, leading to silent data corruption. Edit: link http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf
- acveilleux 12y agoTechnically, SECDED cannot reliably detect errors involving more then 3 bits since they might generate a valid code, they might not however and in that case they might be detected as single or double bit error or possible something else.
- yuhong 12y agoAlso the typical reaction to an uncorrectable ECC error is to halt the system with a NMI.
- makomk 12y agoYeah, ECC is going to make exploiting this reliably a lot harder - you'd need to flip three or more bits in the right combination, without first hitting a combination of bits that'd be detected as an uncorrectable error. Google's report suggests they haven't even been able to cause uncorrectable two-bit errors yet, let alone undetectable three-bit ones.