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I love a lot of the outreach that Matasano does, but I strongly disagree with that article. Most of the points they make aren't fundamental problems of websites
by josephg 12y ago
I love a lot of the outreach that Matasano does, but I strongly disagree with that article. Most of the points they make aren't fundamental problems of websites - they're just issues for poorly implemented websites. Some of it is out of date / plain wrong - for example, we've had a SRNG (window.crypto.getRandomValues) on the web since Chrome 11.
Most of the rest of the complaints you could also reasonably level against installed apps with update mechanisms. The article compares web apps (and their update mechanism) with desktop apps (without their update mechanism). Then it points out flaws in update mechanisms in general (eg they can send you malicious code), then says the thats why the web is flawed. Yeah, nice try.
The fundamental question is: How do you trust the code that I give you? No matter what platform you're on, at some level, you need to trust me. Lets say I'm writing a 'secure' todo list app. You have to trust that I'm not going to forward your todo list entries to any hooded figures. And I'm not going to change your shopping list to quietly add entries from my sponsors. Also both on the web and locally, apps can open mostly-arbitrary network connections and send any data anywhere we like.
Its as simple as that. On the web, I send you code, you run my code, my code does something useful and might betray you. In native apps, I send you code (maybe via an app store or something). You run my code. My code does something useful but it might betray you.
As far as I can tell there's only two fundamental weaknesses of web apps:
1. The JS isn't signed
2. The JS gets sent on every page load
The combination of which makes it much more convenient to do spear-phishing type attacks. But that said, any threat that looks like "but on the web you might send malicious code to user X" is also true of other app update mechanisms. Even on the iOS App Store, nothing is stopping me from writing code which says `if (hash(username+xyz) == abc123) { send data to NSA(); }`. I can't think of any binary-downloading systems (app stores, aptget, etc) which would discover that code.
And remember - desktop app code is potentially much more dangerous. Desktop apps can take photos with your webcam, record audio, record keystrokes and access every file in your home directory.
Its definitely true that most web apps are poorly implemented - they dynamically load 3rd party JS and they don't use SSL / HSTS. Its also embarrassing how many desktop apps have simple buffer overflow exploits. But the solution isn't to go back to desktop apps - the solution is to push for better best practices on the web.
In my opinion, the biggest security problem with the web is that most web apps store all your data in plaintext on someone else's computers. This is a problem that we we need to start addressing systematically via projects like CryptDB. Ie, we need more serious security work done on the web. Not less.
- vertex-four 12y ago> But that said, any threat that looks like "but on the web you might send malicious code to user X" is also true of other app update mechanisms. Traditionally, app updates don't happen without the user's knowledge. I'm not entirely certain what the case is with the app stores. Point is, you can easily choose to stick to a specific version with, at least, most desktop applications. You only have to verify that one version.
- josephg 12y agoPractically speaking, what verification are you talking about? Who do you imagine is verifying the security of your application binaries? I'm confused by the argument that slower app update mechanisms lead to a more secure platform. The reverse is clearly true sometimes - when a vulnerability is discovered, updating an app quickly is important. When would low latency deploys lead to less secure code?
- vertex-four 12y ago> Practically speaking, what verification are you talking about? Who do you imagine is verifying the security of your application binaries? I can build it from source where any number of people may have verified it, or otherwise, I can trust the creator/packager/distributor now but not have to continue trusting them every time I access the app. > When would low latency deploys lead to less secure code? When any number of entities are either taken over by, decide to collaborate with, or become, an attacker at some point after you first download the application.