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Their concerns are seemingly exactly why we have invented hash functions. They have managed to keep BitTorrent (swarms certainly) free of bad actors even when t
by revelation 12y ago
Their concerns are seemingly exactly why we have invented hash functions. They have managed to keep BitTorrent (swarms certainly) free of bad actors even when there is considerable monetary interest in their existence.
- toomuchtodo 12y agoI think the easier way to go about this is have a pub/sub system, where notifications are created to consumers of the torrent link when the Archive generates the metadata for new archived items, and those consumers then join the swarm for that item. Can torrent clients properly handle being part of hundreds of thousands of item swarms at once?
- yungchin 12y agoYes. I'm reminded of a project that I didn't really "get" when I first came across it, the Least Authority File System: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tahoe-LAFS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tahoe-LAFS - it seems these guys have been building for exactly this kind of application!
- sp332 12y agoPlain hashes are vulnerable to all sorts of attacks. Here's a paper on proof of retrievability https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/verstore.pdf https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/verstore.pdf and one on non-outsourceabe storage http://cs.umd.edu/~amiller/nonoutsourceable.pdf http://cs.umd.edu/~amiller/nonoutsourceable.pdf
- quoiquoi 12y agocan you give the tl;dr? What are possible attacks?
- sp332 12y agoJust for example, you could download data, compute the hash, then delete the data. You could pretend to have stored lots of data this way. If someone asks for the hash to prove that you have the data, just give them the hashes you computed earlier. That's what the first paper prevents. Another one is to pretend that you have lots of chunks, and when someone challenges you to produce one, you quickly download it from another source and present it as if you had it all along. That's what the second paper prevents.