3 ms·
Why isn't apache updated to replace the rsa key on an interval shorter than uptime? Even every 5 minutes shouldn't be particularly expensive. That also seems
by x0x0 12y ago
Why isn't apache updated to replace the rsa key on an interval shorter than uptime? Even every 5 minutes shouldn't be particularly expensive. That also seems like a sensible approach.
- mikeash 12y agoThat seems like a potential solution if these ciphers were still otherwise useful, but as far as I can tell they're not, so it's better to just remove them altogether.
- x0x0 12y agoIt lowers the damage stealing a key can do, whether via factoring or some other information leakage, for bad ciphers and good ciphers. And obviously, we should stop supporting intentionally broken ciphers.
- matthewdgreen 12y agoWhat is worth mentioning here is that Apache servers do the same thing for Diffie-Hellman 'ephemeral' keys. We imagine those keys are generated for each session, but in fact one key can last for weeks and millions of sessions. (I leave it to someone with more Apache familiarity to correct me.)
- mnordhoff 12y agoWait, Diffie-Hellman keys? Don't those have to be unique? Do you mean the session ticket keys, used to encrypt session resumption information? https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html
- matthewdgreen 12y agoI mean DHE keys.
- matthewdgreen 12y agoThe TLS spec suggests once per day or every 500 connections. Why didn't they do this? Who knows. Things like that are hard to get right...
- mnordhoff 12y agoIt even suggests you replace the key "more often if possible"! :(
- frozenport 12y agoDoes this open a new venue of attack?