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Secure Boot doesn't build a walled garden if implemented the way it generally is on x86: anyone physically present at boot time can add and remove keys or just
by geofft 12y ago
Secure Boot doesn't build a walled garden if implemented the way it generally is on x86: anyone physically present at boot time can add and remove keys or just disable it (unless someone's set a firmware password). The way it's typically implemented on ARM is a walled garden, but that's not inherent to the technology, nor is it required for the security benefits.
Boot Guard, evidently, doesn't require building a walled garden, either, according to this article. You can use it to securely attest to the signature on the firmware, and seal your hard drive's encryption key to that attestation. That way an unauthorized modification to the firmware won't result in your private data being stolen, but the computer remains usable with an intentional modification to the firmware, whether it's Coreboot or a manual binary patch or whatever.
Freedom and security shouldn't be a tradeoff. Security includes making sure authorized use of the system is permitted. Freedom involves making sure that my computer isn't acting against my interests. We need to stop portraying this as a tradeoff, and we should make it clear that we'll accept (and maybe even demand) security when it is done in the service of computing freedom.
(x86) Secure Boot was a big step forward here for both freedom and security: it lets me make sure that only an OS I choose runs on my machine, and that no nonfree OS, not even the one that came with the computer, will boot up unless I want it to. It also (obviously) played well into the security demands of the wider market. We should be demanding more things like Secure Boot, alongside fewer things like Boot Guard.
- guelo 12y agoThat sounds nice but when the security administrators have total control, and the management beuracracy of different organizations realizes that they have that power, you lose the "general" part of general computer every time. It's really this beurocratic control of the machines that hackers have been rebelling against for decades and is a big part of why the computer revolution has been as egalitarian as it has. Security=control for the powerful=no room for dissent.
- ars 12y agoI don't have a "security administrators" of my computer except for me. If you mean a security administrator of a large company - it's their computer, not yours.
- xai3luGi 12y agoCory Doctorow has a great talk about computers and owners vs users. I can't find the link any more though, anyone have a link?
- andor 12y agoThe coming war on general computation (2011): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg The coming civil war over general purpose computing (2012): http://boingboing.net/2012/08/23/civilwar.html http://boingboing.net/2012/08/23/civilwar.html
- geofft 12y agoThat just means we have a bigger problem: if people are reliant on other people's computers to do their computing, they have no computing freedom at all. The hacker movement has been soft on this for a long time. Blind trust in university accounts is a good example. There's really no reason to believe that your university is less likely to snoop on your mail than Google is. There's in fact a lot more reason to believe that an actual human, with an interest in you specifically, may be doing so. Same with files or processes on a shared server. But hacker culture grew in a time where computing required a shared, large investment in a computer, and so there was no choice but to trust the university computer if you wanted to do any computing at all, and that became an accepted part of the culture. We now live in an age where the personal computer is just about (but not quite) affordable for everyone. We need to shake the idea that you can achieve computing freedom on someone else's computer. Perhaps you can freely compute for them: if you're doing research for a university who's given you an account, or work for an employer who's given you a laptop, by all means, use their computer. The concept of freedom, then, applies to the university or the employer, and you are just their agent. But if you're talking about personal computing, we need to get a personal computer in everyone's hands. We need to solve problems of affordability and accessibility, but people should no more be reliant on a company-issued laptop than on a university-issued shell account.
- nickysielicki 12y ago>if people are reliant on other people's computers to do their computing, they have no computing freedom at all. That's not true. They lack the ability to ensure their freedom, yes. But they don't necessarily lack computing freedom.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- comex 12y agoI don't know why people are portraying measured boot (i.e., allowing the TPM to prove that your system is running some particular set of code) as unilaterally good. Remote attestation was one of the key parts features of trusted computing that people got up in arms about back in the way[1]. After all, in theory, it could be used to enable DRM that is very difficult to crack, making it more difficult to make fair use[2] of videos and other files one has access to. I admit that it doesn't seem terribly dangerous in practice; the portability problems that have prevented remote attestation from being used for DRM in practice on existing hardware are not affected by the TPM chain of trust getting shored up, and the Windows kernel is never going to be anywhere near unhackable. (Instead, DRM on PCs is probably eventually going to use Intel SGX, which allows protecting a userspace process without having to trust the rest of the system, making trusted boot unnecessary; but a harm is not well justified by the existence of a greater harm.) And on the flip side, using TPMs to secure user data against attackers sounds like a very nice feature, especially given the level of sophistication of the threats some people face these days. So I agree that in a cost-benefit analysis, having measured boot is better than not, and it may as well be properly secured. But there is a cost-benefit analysis to having it; it's not pure good. [1] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html [2] I don't mean fair use in a strictly legal sense, because I live in the US where the DMCA forbids breaking DRM even for what would otherwise be fair use under copyright law; but I think it should be fairly uncontroversial that doing so is moral.
- pgeorgi 12y agoRemote attestation poses a problem when working with proprietary network services. But you already have a problem in that case, the network service. But when done sensibly and used in a system that's under the user's control (incl. that remote service), it's a security enhancing feature. And people might not be as much in arms about it anymore because the landscape changed: The original Palladium proposal was made in an environment where the only threat model was "consumers 'steal' content". Today, measured boot is also a legitimate security measure against criminal activity targetted at the user (eg boot kits, extortion ware), which didn't really enter the picture back then.
- geofft 12y ago
- Perseids 12y ago> Secure Boot doesn't build a walled garden if implemented the way it generally is on x86: anyone physically present at boot time can add and remove keys or just disable it That is true for very competent end users, but near impossible for the general masses. We have come so far as to be able to install big Linux distributions like Fedora and Ubuntu without any hassle on Secure Boot systems. That only works though, because their bootloader, kernel and kernel modules were blessed (i.e. signed) by the distributor. Building your own kernel still requires you to disable Secure Boot (or far more difficult, add your own key to Secure Boot and sign everything yourself). Heck, even ZFS, which is otherwise as easy to install as adding a third party repository, is incompatible with secure boot, as it loads a custom kernel module. Now, to visualize the real world difficulty of disabling secure boot imagine guiding your spouse or friend through this process over the phone: Reboot the system a few times until they found the text telling which key press during boot to enter EFI setup or guess correctly for their hardware manufacturer, let them read out aloud what they see - possibly in a language they don't speak well if the interface is not localized, navigate them through the menus, find out how to change the Secure Boot setting (one should think switching binary settings and moving stuff up and down in a list would be a solved UI problem nowadays… speaking from experience with my HP Probook UEFI interface, it is not, though), (if you are particularly unlucky: explain which keys of their keyboard layout map to the needed US keyboard layout), exit and safe the settings.