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Bruce makes a good point here. There is a balance between the COMSEC and SIGINT. Any advance you make in SIGINT is a failure of COMSEC and vice versa. The issue
by Balgair 12y ago
Bruce makes a good point here. There is a balance between the COMSEC and SIGINT. Any advance you make in SIGINT is a failure of COMSEC and vice versa. The issue is then the 'viruses' of our internet ecosystem, the hackers and state level threats. How do you balance the two? Will the nature of the system self-balance as threats are discovered and then bandaged?
Still, good job not just demonizing the NSA, they serve a purpose in the game of international relations, one that the free world may not like, but that we all need.
- canistr 12y agoIt seems to be a sort of universal truth in that the people trying to break a system will always be ahead of people trying to secure/protect it. Why then, would prioritizing COMSEC over SIGINT change any of that? COMSEC will never catch up to SIGINT. I'm curious to know what exactly the NSA currently does to protect the US. Do they already use their existing SIGINT knowledge to update systems ahead of attacks?
- Balgair 12y agoWell, maybe the lemma is flawed. Maybe they are not always ahead. I mean, to date, no one has even been able to decode Kryptos, right out front of the CIA in plain view: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kryptos https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kryptos Again, what the NSA does to protect the US is an open question; if they did their job right, you'll likely not know it. Updating systems, at least large commercial ones that foreign governments use as well as the US citizenry, is not in the purview of their mandate, its the opposite. They do try to tell the world what they do, so as to justify themselves in some degree to their ultimate bosses (the US voting public). The Iranian nuke viruses are a good example, though, as far as I know, they have not claimed that particular hack yet.