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> HTTP is '90s tech. TCP/IP is '70s tech. There's nothing inherently wrong with that. Sure there is. For one, we were talking about encryption protocols. Those

> HTTP is '90s tech. TCP/IP is '70s tech. There's nothing inherently wrong with that. Sure there is. For one, we were talking about encryption protocols. Those are not encrypted. The one that is encrypted, HTTPS, sucks (the whole CA system). So after Snowden's documents came out I would've expected more people to say "it's time to get rid of HTTPS". That hasn't quite happened yet, and I'm disappointed by that. In case w As for TCP/IP, again, not encrypted, and they need to be. In case we've forgotten, TCP/IP and HTTP is what made it happen for the Internet to become a giant spy machine. That to me means they are broken. We need to switch to something like CurveCP, MinimaLT, Noise, etc, that is encrypted by default at the Transport or even the IP layer. If we agree "encrypting all the things needs" to happen, then the current state of TCP/IP and HTTP is horrible, and we're not moving fast enough to replace them. The fact that we don't yet have a good encrypted by default alternative to TCP/IP and HTTP/S is what will also bring us a world of hurt when the "Internet of Things" arrives in a big way, along with self-driving "smart" cars that can be remotely updated (and hacked).

lmm 12y ago
The CA system sucks but what would you replace it with? The only remotely viable alternative candidate is the OpenPGP web of trust, and, well, see the article. Transport is the wrong layer to do encryption (much as I'd love to see more adoption of IPSec) because encryption and authentication are inextricably linked. Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you? TLS is, despite all the problematic cipher suites, fundamentally sound infrastructure - which is why it hasn't been replaced. The same is true of OpenPGP. We don't need new protocols, just better implementations - an equivalent of LibreSSL for OpenPGP.
- goodmornings 12y ago
  The question is why you are even talking to 174.16.23.46 and not a something that is verifiable.
- timboslice 12y ago
  > Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you? In the current post Snowden climate, can't we agree that this is at least a good thing? The good it does at the most basic level is protect your communications from prying eyes.
  - lmm 12y ago
    Does it though? There's no point encrypting everything twice at two different layers. And if you use an unauthenticated protocol running over IPSec, you can have a dangerously false sense of security.

lmm 12y ago

The CA system sucks but what would you replace it with? The only remotely viable alternative candidate is the OpenPGP web of trust, and, well, see the article. Transport is the wrong layer to do encryption (much as I'd love to see more adoption of IPSec) because encryption and authentication are inextricably linked. Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you? TLS is, despite all the problematic cipher suites, fundamentally sound infrastructure - which is why it hasn't been replaced. The same is true of OpenPGP. We don't need new protocols, just better implementations - an equivalent of LibreSSL for OpenPGP.

goodmornings 12y ago
The question is why you are even talking to 174.16.23.46 and not a something that is verifiable.
timboslice 12y ago
> Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you? In the current post Snowden climate, can't we agree that this is at least a good thing? The good it does at the most basic level is protect your communications from prying eyes.
- lmm 12y ago
  Does it though? There's no point encrypting everything twice at two different layers. And if you use an unauthenticated protocol running over IPSec, you can have a dangerously false sense of security.